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Report of Special Master
(Honorable Albert B. Maris)

v.
MAINE, NEW HAMFSHIRE,
MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.

1.

This is the Atlantic coast boundary case.

In 1969, the Court granted the

United States leave to file a complaint against the Atlantic coastal states to resolve
respective claims to the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of that portion
of the continental shelf underlying the Atlantic Ocean.

395 U.S. 955.

The Report

of the Special Master., following the holdings of this Court in United States v. Californi a,
332 u.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) 1 and United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), concludes that with the exception of the seabed and

subsoil deeded the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 19 53~ the United States is

(

entitled as against the defendant states to that portion of the continental shelf lying
more than three geographical miles seaward from the coastline.
BACKGROUND: In United States v. California,
federal government had
the California coast,

11

11

supra~

the Court held that the

paramount rights 11 in the three-mile territorial sea along

an incident to which is full dominion over

the soil under that water area.l' including oil.

11

332 U.S. at 39.

~he

resources of

The Court rejected

California's argument that since the 13 original states had acquired from the English
Crown ownership of all lands under the sea within at least three miles of their
respective coasts, California was entitled to stand on an equal footing with respect
to the three-mile marginal sea off its coast.

The Court found that the equal footing

doctrine did not support California's claim because the 13 original states had not
themselves acquired as colonies and did not separately own the three-mile belt or
the seabed of the adjacent territorial sea.

332 U.S. at 31-34.

In United States v.

Louisiana, supra, and United States v. Texas, supra, the Court followed and applied
the rule of the California case.l' stating in Louisiana:
If, as we held in California 1 s case, the three-mile
belt is in the domain of the Nation rather than that of
the separate States, it follows a fortiori that the
ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward
of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly
related to the national defense, the conduct of foreign
affairs 3 and world commerce than is the marginal
sea. Certainly it is not less so. 339 U.S. 705-706.

Subsequent to the Court's decisions in these cases, Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act of 19 53o

The Act relinquished to the coastal states all rights of

the United States to lands within three geographical miles of their coastline.

Sub-

sequently, the United States attempted to clarify ownership of submerged land
resources in the Gulf of Mexico by instituting suit against the five Gulf Coast states.

See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).

(

boundaries are still in litigation.

(The Florida and Louis i ana Gulf

No. 52 Orig, see Summer List 18, and Ko . 9 Orig,

see Summer List 15, Sheet 4.) In 1969, the United States filed the present a c tio n ,
asserting that the defendant states claim some right, title or interest adverse to the
United States in the continental shelf more than three geographical miles se a ward
from their respective coastlines, that Maine has purported to grant exclusiv e oil
and gas exploration and exploitation rights in approximately 3, 300 1 000 acres of
seabed in the area in controversy and that the defendant states are interfering with
and obstructing the exploration, leasing and development of those mineral resources
by the United States and will continue to do so, unless the rights of the United States
are declared and established by this Court.>:< The complaint seeks a declaratory
decree and a direction for an accounting for money derived by the defendant states

( '----'

from the area owned by the United States.
All of the defendant states filed answers, asserting by way of affirmative defense
that as successors in title to certain grantees of the Crown of England (and, in the
case of New York, also of the Crown of Holland) they are entitled to exercise dominion
and control over the exploration and development of such natural resources as may
be found in, on or about the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean adjacent

>!<President Truman 1 s Proclamation of September 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884, first
claimed for the United States jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of
the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United
States. It opened a new chapter in the international law applicable to this area. For
it, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, in force June 10, 1964, 15 U.S. T.
Pt. 1, p. 471, which followed it, assured to each coastal nation the exclusiv e ri ght
to explore and exploit the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the adjacent continental shelf beyond the territorial sea regardless of whether or not the nation had
actually occupied or exploited the seabed and subsoil, the resources of which it claim e C..
In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 1953, 67 Stat. 4 6 2, 4 6 8,
Congress declared "the urgent need for further exploration and development o f the oil
and gas deposits of the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf" and to that end
provided for the issuance of mineral leases in that area by the Secretary of the Interio r
to private operators.

to their respective coastlines to the exclusion of any other political entity \-r.-hatsoever 1
including the United States, subject only to the limits of national seaward jurisdiction

.

'

established by the United States, that their power· to exercise such dominio n and control is not prohibited by the Constitution and has never been delegated to the United
States, and that any attempt by the United States to assert such pow e r with respect
to the defendant states violates the Tenth Amendment and is void..

Additio nal defense s

are asserted by Rhode Island, North Carolina and Georgia.
In 1970 1 the United States filed a motion for judgment on the ground that there
is in the litigation no genuine is sue as to any material fact.

The states opposed,

submitting that the preferable course would be to refer the case to a master.

The

Court did not rule on the motion for judgment, but in June 1970, appointed Judge Mar is
Special Master and referred the case to him.

398 U.S. 94 7.

Confere n ces and hearings before the Special Master were held through January,

1973 1 the transcript of which totals 2 1 800 pages.

Because Florida 1 s case presented

questions novel to the other states 1 including the resolution of Florida 1 s Gulf Coast
boundaries 1 the Special Master recommended and this Court granted a se v erance.
(Exceptions and briefs have been filed to Judge Maris 1 report in the Florida proceeding.

United States v. Florida-» Orig 52, Summer List 18 1 Sheet 2.)
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER:

The Special Master defines the basic

question involved in this litigation as:
[W]hether the right to explore and exploit the natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil of that portion of
the continental shelf underlying the Atlantic Ocean
which is more than three geographical miles seaward
from the coastline of the United States belongs to the
United States or to the defendant States or any of them.
,___.J

The Special Master first considers the outstanding motion of the United States for
judgment, assuming that the referral of the case to hi1n was not intended to be a

denial of the motion, but rather as an indic a tion of the Court 1 s desire for a full
development of and report on the facts in the
involved.

ligh~

of which to consider the issues

Reviewing this Court 1 s holdings in the ·California, Louisiana, and Texas

cases, the Special Master rejects the states 1 argument that these decisions haye been
repudiated by Congress and by subsequent decisions of the Court and concludes that
the rule announced in those cases and later "approved and declar.ed to be applicable
to all coastal states by the second Louisiana case 363 U.S. 1 1 ?, remains in full
vigor and applies to all the defendant States in this proceeding, foreclosing the issues
of fact raised by them and requiring as a matter of law the entry of judgment for the
United States on its motion.

11

In a lengthy discussion which reflects on the validity of this Court 1 s previous

holdings, the Special Master traces the development of international law on the
I

(\_-

claim of coastal states to sovereignty of adjacent seas and, reject.i ng the historical
and constitutional arguments raised by the defendant states, sets forth his conclusions
in part D of the Report.

Among the 32 conclusions reached by the Special Master

are: (12) the charters of the original colonies did not grant maritime sovereignty or
dominion over a territorial sea, a concept then unknown, or property rights in the
seabed or its resources; (15) Colonial law and practice prior to 1776 do not support
the claim that property rights to the seabed of the marginal sea seaward for 100
miles or any lesser distance had been granted to the colonies or that such rights
were exercised by them except in a few cases where portions of the seabed within
the three -mile limit were actually occupied; (1 7). from and after the date of independence, the United States constituted a union of internally independent states with a
national government to which were delegated certain powers including the powers
associated with external sovereignty such as the conduct of foreign relations, of

··,

defense and of foreign commerce; (19) if the states had any rights to sovereignty
of the marginal sea and ownership of the seabed off their coasts which they had
received in any

manner~

which the Special Master does not find that they did have,

those rights would have been lost to the national government upon their ratification
of the Constitution; (21) the preponderance of the evidence confirms the historical

findings made in the California case; (22) prior to the

Proclamat~on

of President

Truman in 1945 1 rights to the resources of the seabed beyond territorial waters
could be obtained only on the basis of prescription or actual occupation and neither
the United States nor the defendant States had made any such claim; (23) the Proclamation for the first time claimed for the United States jurisdiction and control over
the natural resources of the continental shelf beyond the three-mile limit of the
territorial sea and (24) this claim was validly made by and on behalf of the United
States under its powers of external sovereignty and did not enure to the individual
benefit o_f any of the coastal states.
The Spe·cial Master also found that it does not appear that any exploration or
exploitation has been carried on by the licensee of Maine or that any payments have
been made by it to that state 1 and that an accounting is not required.

The Special

Master has appended a recommended decree.
DISCUSSION: I would note that although several of the defendant states appeared
as amici in the California

case~

they have not yet had their day in Court on the issues

presented here.
The Report of the Special Master should be · ordered filed and the parties ordered
to file exceptions and briefs.

9/16/74
PJN

Ginty
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Supreme cO"urt. 8. t.

F.ILE.Il

·.

MICHAEL RODAK. .IR.. Cl£11

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,

v.
STATE OF MAINE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

.

lniV

TO ALLOCATE FOUR HOURS
ARGUMENT
Jc~J.r%~~ MOTION FOR
¥-fj(r\}., wi~L
b4 v.>~
faY~ ...J
The twelve defendant States respectfully move
r(01J~r;~~

~~~~~

to

;;_hfl..·

the Court to allocate four hours for argument, with two
hours to be allocated to the plaintiff and two hours to
the defendants.
This action places at issue for the first time
the momentous question of ownership, as between the States
and the Federal Government, of the resources of the outer
continental shelf in the Atlantic Ocean.

It is one of the

most important cases to come before this Court in many
years, in terms of the magnitude both of the practical
interests at stake and of the legal principles involved.
This case will determine ownership of the resources
of the entire outer continental shelf from Maine to Georgia,
inclusive, from the three-mile limit out to 100 miles or
more into the sea, comprising a submarine area of more than
125,000 square miles, an area larger than the British Isles.
The value of the economic resources at stake has been
estimated in the trillions of dollars.
The present case presents extraordinarily complex
issues of fact and law.

....

JAN 23 1975

No. 35, Original

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

.. -

It requires decision of several

- 2 constitutional issues of great moment.

It also requires a

close examination of the development of legal theory, and
the evolution of state practice, regarding continental-shelf
resources in England and this country, and internationally,
c:.J"' rJ
1
over more than four centuries.
For-these -reasons the Court
l

,.

referred the case to a Special Master, before whom extensive
evidentiary hearings were held and an exhaustive record compiled.
The proceedings before the Special Master evoked
sharp conflicts on a most unusual range and variety of factual,
legal and constitutional issues.

The Master's Report, compris-

ing 88 printed pages, made extensive findings and conclusions.
The States have excepted from these findings and conclusions,
and are convinced that the Master's approach was basically
and massively in error and cannot be sustained.
Since this case is within the Court's original
jurisdiction, the Court is, of course, the trier of fact as
well as law.

In this extraordinary case, even more than in

the usual original-jurisdiction case, "this Court has the duty
of making an independent examination of the evidence."
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 470 (1945)

Ge orgia

(Stone, C.J.

dissenting) .
While nine of the defendant States are represented
by

~

c

on Counsel, they desire (if scheduling problems can

be overcome) to present argument by the Attorney General of

*I
one of themselves as well as by Common Counsel.-

One or

- *! The Common Counsel States are Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island and Virginia.
North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia are separately represented, but have joined in this
Motion.
'

- 3 -

more of the three States not represented by Common Counsel,
some of which have special defenses, may wish to argue
separately.
The time allowed in No. 35, Original, should not
be limited because of the pendency of two other "tidelands"
cases.

No. 9, Original, United States v. Louisiana, differs

fundamentally from the present case since it involves comparatively technical questions relating to the precise
location of boundary lines in the Gulf.

No. 52, Original,

United States v. Florida, is related to the present case
insofar as any decision in favor of the defendant States in
the present case would also redound to the benefit of Florida;
but, while No. 52, Original, cannot be conclusively resolved
before decision in the present case, the broad common issues
of state ownership of the Atlantic Coast seabed beyond three
miles are presented for argument solely in the present case.
This Court has generally accommodated the scheduling
of time for oral argument to allow such extra time as might be
necessary for a full presentation where issues of great complexity and moment are involved.

Only recently, the Court

allowed three hours for oral argument in the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, No. 74-165, et al., decided on
December 16, 1974, 43 U.S.L. Wk. 4031.

The present litigation

is in no way less important and, in its historical factual
evidence, vastly more complicated and difficult to present.
The defendant States submit that ample time for
argument is required if the Court is to explore the issues
sufficiently to do justice in this case.

The States believe

that four hours are necessary for that purpose.

They so

- 4 advised the Court by letter to the Clerk dated October 2,
1974.

They now renew that advice and that request by

Motion.
Respectfully submitted,

Andrew P. Miller
Attorney General of Virginia
Gerald L. Baliles
Deputy Attorney General
Supreme Court Library Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Richard W. Wier, Jr.
Attorney General of Delaware
Charles Brandt
Assistant Attorney General
Wilmington Tower
12th & Market Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Joseph Brennan
Attorney General of Maine
Donald G. Alexander
As~istant Attorney General
State House
Augusta, Maine 04330
Francis B. Burch
Attorney General of Maryland
Henry R. Lord
Deputy Attorney General
One South Calvert Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Franci X. Bellotti
Attorney General of Massachusetts
Robert M. Bonin
First Assistant Attorney General
State House
Boston, Massachusetts 02133
Warren B. Rudman
Attorney General of New Hampshire
David H. Souter
Deputy Attorney General
State House Annex
Concord, New Hampshire 03301

'

William F. Hyland
Attorney General of New Jersey
Elias Abelson
Assistant Attorney General
198 West State Street
Trenton, New Jersey 08608

•

•
- 5 -

Louis J. Lefkowitz
Attorney General of New York
Joseph T. Hopkins
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Julius C. Michaelson
Attorney General of Rhode Island
Providence County Court House
Providence, Rhode Island 02903
Rufus Edmisten
Attorney General of North Carolina
Jean A. Benoy
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice Building
Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Daniel R. McLeod
Attorney General of South Carolina
Edward B. Latimer
Assistant Attorney General
Hampton Office Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Arthur K. Bolton
Attorney General of Georgia
Alfred L. Evans, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
132 State Judicial Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
Brice M. Clagett
Michael Boudin
Covington & Burling
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006
Attorneys for the States of Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island and Virginia

January 22, 1975
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January 24, 1975 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 35 Orig.
UNITED STATES

Exceptions to Report of
Special Master and Replies
Thereto

v.
MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.
This is the Atlantic coast boundary case in which the Special
Master, following the holdings of United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
(1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and Unit ed Stat e s
v. Texa.s, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), concludes that with the exception of the
sea bed and sub sail deeded the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 195 3,
the United States is entitled as against the defendant states to that portion
of the continental shelf lying more than three geographical miles seaward

- 2 -

of the coastline.

The Report was ordered filed and exceptions and replies

thereto called for on October 15.
Exceptions have been taken by the defendant States and extensive
briefs have been filed.
January 21.

The United States filed its reply brief Tuesday,

I have not been able to prepare a memorandum summarizing

the litigation.

I will circulate a memorandum next week.

There would seem little question, however, but that the case should
be set for oral argument.

Setting the case for argument at this Conference

would provide the parties sufficient time to prepare for argument in
February.

The Clerk tentatively plans to set the case for argument the

second argument week in February, together with United States v. Louisiana,
No. 9 Orig., and United States v. Florida, No. 52 Orig.
There is a reply brief by the SG.
Ginty
l/23/75
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White, J ..................... .
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Ja n uary 24, 1975 Conference .,,
L ist 3, Sheet 2

No o 35 O rig.
UNI T ED STATES

Exception to Report of
Special Master and
Reply Thereto

v.
MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE
MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.

1.

This case involves the claim of 12 of the 13 Atlantic coast states (Florida is

proceeding separately in No. 52 Orig.) to the natural resources of the continental
shelf adjacent to their respective coastlines.

Citing United States v. California,

332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United

3:_/I was unable to prepare a memorandum summarizing the litigation in this
c ase in time for the January 24 Conference. The present memorandum is submitted for whatever assistance it might provide in preparing for argmnent.

·l

- 2 States v.

Texas,

339 U.S.

707 (1950), the Special Master has concL:ded that wit!:

the exception of the seabed deeded the States by the Submerged Lanes Act of 193 3
43 U.S. C .

13 01 et seq, the United States is entitled as against the cefendant Stat e

to that portion of the continental s helf lying more than three geogra?:'"lical miles
seaward of the coastline.

The defendant States have filed exceptions to virtually all the Special Master's
~

principle pr oposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

::-.Jorth Carolina, South

Carolina and Georgia have filed a separate brief and except speci fi cally to 29 of
the Master's 32 delineated conclusions, 22 as being contrary to the evidence; 4
as being irre levant; and 3 on the ground that they are contrary to the law and the
evidence.

The remaining States, Delaware, Maine,

New Hampshire,

New Jersey,

Maryland,

Massachusetts,

New York, Rhode Island and Virginia, are repre-

sented by c ommon counsel and except to the report of the Master in a more
general manner.

-

They identify 15 issues on which they take exception.

The

United States has filed no exceptions, but has submitted a brief in response to
the defendant State s 1 briefs in support of their exceptions.
Four hours ha ve been granted the parties for oral argument,
presently is scheduled to be called Monday afternoon,
BACKGROUND:

In United States v.

and the case

February 24.

California, the Court held that the federa

government had ttparamount rights 11 in the three-mile belt of territorial sea
adjacent to the California coast, nan incident to which is full dominion over the
resources of the soil under that water area, including oil. n

332 U.S. at 38-39.

The Court rejected California's argument that since the 13 original states had acqu ire
from the English Crown title to the land under the sea within at least three miles o f
their coasts, California was entitled to stand on an
the three-mile marginal sea off its coast.

11

equal footing 11 \vith respect to

The Court found that the equal footing

doctrine did not support California's claim because ~~it could not be iound] that the

•'

- 3 thirteen original colonies separately acquired ownership to the three-mile b elt or
the soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the E n g li s l': .
Crown by their re v olution against it.

11

332 at 31.

In United States v. Louis i ana a nC.

United States v. Texas, the Court followed and applied t h e rule of Californi c:., stati:l£
in Louisiana:
As we pointed out in United States v . Califor ni a, the
issue in this class of litigation does not turn on title
or owner ship in the conventional sense. <;aliiornia,
like the thir~I?-~.!.i:J~.~-~ ies, never ac3:..ui~d
owner ship in the marginal sea. The claim to our
t~~asfi?sraSserted by the nati onal
goverrunent. Protection and control of [the m arginal
sea] are • • • functions of national external so,·ereignty
• • • • The marginal sea is a national, not a state
concern. National inter ests, nati~ .;al responsibilities,
nit1onal concerns are involved. The problems of
commerce, national defense, relations with other
powers, war and peace focus there. National rights
must therefore be paramount in that area.

*

*

I

If, as we held in California 1 s case, the three-mile
belt is in the domain of the Nation rather than that
of the separate states, it follows~ fortiori t h at the
}
ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward
of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly
related to . the national defense, the conduct o f foreign
affairs, and world commerce than is the mar gina!
sea. Certainly it is not less so. 339 U.S. 704,
70 5-06.

Subsequent to the Court 1 s decisions in these cases, Congress passed th e
Submerged Lands Act of 1953.

The Act relinquished to t h e coastal states a ll rig h: s

of the United States to lands within three geographical n "li les of their coas tli ne.

S·.:·::> -

sequently, the United States sought to clarify ownership o f submerged la ne reso u r c es
in the Gulf of Mexico by instituting suit against the five Gulf Coast states.
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
No. 9 Orig.

1

See "l· r:.:.t e d

(The Florida, ~o. 52 Orig., and Lo u is ia a a,

cases which also are to be argued this month represent the e n d o f tl: e

Gulf Coast litigation.) In 1969, the United States filed the present action, asser t:::tg
that the defendant States claim some right, title or interest adverse to t h e Cnit ed

- 4 - •
St a t es in t h e continental shelf more than three geographical miles seawarc f rom their
r es pec tive coastlines, that Maine has purported to grant exclus i ve oil anc g as e>..'Plorati on and exploration rights in approximately 3, 300,000 acres o f seabed i n t h e area in
c o ntrover s y and that the defendant States are interfering with a::1d obstr u ct i ng the ex-

p lo r a tion., leasing and development of those mineral resources '::>y the U nit ed States a nd

will continue to do so., unless the rights of the United States are declare d and establis he
b y the C ourt. .,-·-.

The complaint seeks a declaratory decree and a direct ion for an

a c c o unt i ng for money derived by the defendant States from the area owne d by the Unite ci
States.
All of t h e defendant States filed answers, asserti ng by wa y of affir rr. ativ e defens e
t ha t as s uccessors in title to certain grantees of the Crown of England,

t~ ey

are

e ntitled to exercise dominion and control over the exploration and development of
such n atural resources as may be found in, on or about the sea'::>ed and s u bsoil under-

( '--'

l y ing the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to their respective coastlines to the exclusion of
a n y o th~ r political entity, subject only to the limits of national seaward ju risdiction

e s tabli she d by the United States, that their power to exercise such dom i nion and cont rc
i s no t prohibited by the Constitution and has never been delega t ed to the C nited States,

.:_/President Truman's Proclamation of September 28, 1 9 ~ 5 claime c for the Unit ed
State s jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of t~ e subsoil and seabed of
the c ontinental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the United Sta t es. Exec. Proc. 26 6 1,
S ept . 28, 1 945, 10 FR 12303. See also Convention on the Co nti nental s :::e lf, in force
J une 10, 1 96 4, 15 U.S. T. Pt. 1, p. 471, which assured to eac h coasta l :1ation the
exclusive right to explore and exploit the resources of the ad_i acent cont:. :1 ental shelf
beyond the territorial sea regardless of whether or not the na t ion had ac tu ally
occupied or expl9ited the seabed and subsoil.
In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of August 7, 19 53 , 43 U.S. C. 1331, ~ se
C ongress declared 11 the urgent need for further exploration a nd develop r.: ent of the
oil and gas deposits of the submerged lands of the o u ter Conti :1ental She l:· • and to
t hat e nd provided for the issuance o f n >ineral leases by the Se c retary a: th e Interior.

- 5 and that any attempt by the United States to assert such power with respect to the
· defendant States violates the 1Oth Amendment and is ·Void.

Additional defe:1se s were

asserted by Rhode Island, North Ca rolina and Georgia, but these appear to ::a,· e been
abandoned on review here.
In 1970, the United States moved for judgment on the pleadings, conte::1.C.ing that
there is no is sue as to any material fact involved in the litigation.

The States oppo se c.

submitting that the preferable course would be to refer the case to a master.

Without

specifically ruling on the motion of the United States, the Court appointed Jt.:.dge Alber:
Maris Special Master and referred the case to him.

398 U.S. 947.

Because Florida raised defenses novel to the other States':' and because of Florid::

pending Gulf coast litigation, the Master recommended and this Court granted Flo ride.
a severance.

403 U.S. 949, 950.

Florida 1 s case is before the Court in :\"o. 52 Orig.

and will be argued in tandem with this case.
i

'-•

Conferences and hearings before the Special Master were held thro ugh January
1973, the transcript of which totals 2, 800 pages.

The Report of the Special ::\1a ster

was ordered filed and exception and reply briefs called for an October 15, 1 974.
brief of North Carolina _e t al totals 83 pages, plus 149 pages of appendices.
.et al, the

11

Delaware

Common Counsel States," have filed a 140 -page brief, a 48 5 -page

mental brief,

11

11

supple·

and three volumes of appendices totaling more than 1, 000 pages.

SG has filed a 59-page reply brief.

The

The

Amicus briefs have been filed by the Special

Committee on Tidelands of the National Association of Attorneys General a::J.d by the
Associated Gas Distributors.
REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER EXCEPTIONS AND
A.
'---"

CONTE~TIO:\"S:

The Special Master first considers the outstanding motion of the L:ni ted State :

for judgment.

He assumes that the referral of the case to him was not inte::1.ded to be

':'/Florida claims that upon its readmission into the Union, Congress a:mroved t::.
marine boundaries of the State as described in its Constitution of 1 S68 , ,,·::-:ich bound a
ries, it argues, run more than three miles seaward of its coast in certa :.::J. parts o f
the Atlantic •

•

l' ,.""

- 6 a denial of the motion, but an indication of the Court 1 s desire for a full development
of and report on the facts in which to consider the issues.

The Master then reviews

this Court 1 s holdings in California, Louisiana and Texas.

He rejects the States 1 ar gu -

ment that these decisions have been repudiated by Congress in the Submerged Lands
Act and by subsequent decisions of the Court.

He cites the following language of the

Court in Louisiana II:
Since [the Submerged Lands Act] concededly did not
impair the validity of the California, Louisiana, and
Texas cases, which are admittedly applicable to all
coastal states, this case draws i n question only.
363 U.S. at 7.
and concludes that the rule announced in Cal ifornia, Louisiana and Texas and later
"approved and declared to be applicable to all coastal states in the second Louisiana
case 363 U.S. 1, 7, remains in full vigor and applies to all the defendant States in
this proceeding, foreclosing the issues of fact raised by them and requiring as a
.'--...-

matter of law the entry of judgment for the 'l"nited States on its motion.

11

Th~ defendant States ':' contend that the issues raised here are in no way foreclosed
by California.

First, they argue principles relative to the doctrine of res judicata:

that the Court has never previously adjudicated the rights of the States to the Atlantic
seabed, that none of the defendant States ,,.as a party to the Cali fornia litigation, and
that it is well settled that a stranger to litigation is not concluded by its resolution
of either factual or legal issues.

Second, t h e states argue that the Master misreads

California in imputing to it a constitutional doctrine making federal owner ship a
necessary adjunct to federal foreign-affairs and defense powers.

They note the

Court• s reference to "equal footing 11 principles in defeating Texa s 1 claims in the

.:_/The exceptions and arguments of Korth Carolina et al and the Common Counse l
States do not appear to be significantly di f: erent and are not treated separately unless
otherwise noted. This is the approach taken by the SG who appears to focus on the
brief of the Common Counsel States.

Texas case and cite the Court 1 s opinion upholding the Submerged Lanas

ACt,

.tna:oama ".

Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), and the subsequent confirmation of the claims of Florida
and Texas to three leagues in the Gulf under the historical standard established by the
Act.

Louisiana II, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).

The States reason that either California did not rest on any ground of necessary federal
ownership or that that ground has been reconsidered and rejected sub silentio.

They

then go on to argue that such a doctrine is in any event unsound in view of the federal
government's preemptive power which would override any state action that would create
international problems, interfere with foreign policy etc.

[See Justice Reed 1 s dis sent

;>owefl ~ •

in California regarding the federal
that any such

11

government 1 s

plenary" 332 U.S. at 42-43.] and

inseparability 11 concept was repudiated by Congress in the Submerged

Lands Act in granting the States the three-mile territorial sea and by this Court in
Louisiana II and Florida.

Thirdly, the States maintain that California-- because of the

nature of the equal-footing claims advanced- -focused on whether there existed a uniform three-mile belt in the 18th century and did not find as a historical fact that the
Atlantic States did not own the resources of the seabed along their coasts.

Also, the

States contend that the ruling in California derived from a lack of evidence, that it is
not a definitive historical finding, and that the States have here produced massive
evidence~

in support of their historic claims.

Lastly, the defendant States argue

that their historic claims are supported by a presumption of validity in that under the
Constitution, the States are residual owners of property and that the common understanding for a century and a half was that the States owned the submerged lands
adjacent to their coasts.

See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. _240 ( 1891 );

Pollard 1 s Lessee v. Hogan, 44 U.S. ( 3 How.) 212 ( 1845 ); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
\....__,

'

(16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
The United States notes that the Master considered the States 1 arguments barred
not by the doctrine of res judicata but by that of stare decisis.

The SG questions

- 8 whether t he State s 1 assertion that the historical record was inadequa t ely presente d
i n t he California, even if true, would warrant a departure from the doctrine of stare
d e ci s i s i n v iew of the substantial reliance that Congress, the states, and the federa :
gove r nment have placed upon that decision.

He then ar g ues that the States m i srea d

t h e M aster's report in imputing to him a reading of t h e Cali fornia dec i sion as

rest i::~

upon a pr e sumed inseparability of foreign-affairs and defense powers with owners l:.:.:_::
of seabed resources.

The United States points out t hat the significa:1 ce of federal

foreig n-affairs and defense powers in California was two-fold:

(1) t r. e United States

o ri ginally had acquired dominion and control over the territorial sea through the
exer cise of those powers, and (2) the degree to whic h the territoria l sea is a ff ecte C.
by those powers made it inappropriate for the Court, as the explica t or of constitutional doctrine, to extend the Pollard rule of state reparian owners h.:.p of inland wa: e rs
out into the soil beneath the ocean • • • •

11

11

332 U.S. at 36.

Moreo y er, the SG ur ges ,

the b asis of the California decision was reconfirmed rather than re pudiated by the
'

Subm erged Lands Act by which

11 the

United States relinquished to t h e coastal States

a ll of its rights in such lands within certain geographi cal limits, and confirmed it s
ow n rights therein beyond those limits.

11

Louisiana II , 363 U.S. at 6 -7.

The SG a : :: o

n otes that Congress expressly asserted federal ownership o f the na tu ral resources ;:):
t h e s eabed of the Atlantic Ocean seaward of the terr i torial sea in t l: e Outer Contir: e :::al
She lf Lands Act and in doing so necessarily relied u pon the Califor .::.:. a decision.

:-:-.e

SG contends that the finding in Cali fornia that the Atlantic coast sta :e s, and their
predecessor colonies, had no owner ship interest in the seabed adj a c ent to their s :-.a ::-e ~
was integral to the Court 1 s conclusion that Califor ni a was not ent i t l ed to its cl airr.::
u nder the equal footing doctrine.
r

\

And, he notes, t h at the Court ex-tended this pr i::c:.?l•

of f ederal ownership beyond the three-mile belt in Louisiana.
m aintains that the historical

~oldings

Las t l y , the United S:c.t'

of California w ere based not u pon a lack o f

evidence as suggested by the States, but rather upon a "multitude o f references ' ' a:--c

a "wealth of material,

11

332 U.S. at 31, and further notes the observation by the

Special Master here that "many of the historical documents, although admittedly not
all, which have been introduced as exhibits . • • were before [the Court] in the California
case.

11

The SG argues that the additional evidence submitted by the States is largely

cumulative and contributes little to the body of historical knowledge that was before
the Court in California.

He also notes that Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey

participated in California as amici curiae.
Although holding the State s 1 claims foreclosed by California, the Special

B.

Master nevertheless reviewed and weighed the evidence and arguments concerning
the his toric basis of the California decision.

In a lengthy discussion which reflects

on the validity of this Court's previous holdings, the Master traces the development
of international law on the claim of the coastal states to sovereignty of adjacent seas
and, rejecting the historical and constitutional arguments raised by the States, sets
forth his c onclusions in part D of the Report.

In particular, the Master found ( 1) that

at the time of the American Revolution, British law did not recognize a sovereign right
to ownership of the seabed of the outer continental shelf; (2) that the English charters
es tablishing the American colonies did not grant ownership of the seabed; (3) that
c olonial activities do not support the defendant States' contention that the colonies
either had been granted or claimed or exercised dominion and control of the seabed
beyond the three-mile marginal sea; (4) that even if the colonies had, contrary to the
evidence, been granted or had exercised such dominion and control, their rights
would have passed to the United States as attributes of external sovereignty at independence or upon ratification of the Constitution; and ( 5) that the defendant States did
not acquire any interest in the seabed of the outer continental shelf subsequent to
ratification of the Constitution.
On these historical points the parties argue extensively from an abundance of
sometimes conflicting evidence.

..

! .:

~ ~.

'

Underlying the States' exceptions to the Master's

. 10 -

-

findings is their c ontent i o n that he a pplied an erroneous methodology. The States
·argue t h at the M a ster depend ed too much on seco nd ary sources, paid r xtra o r d inar y
defer e nce to o ne such source -Fulton's The Sovere i£ nty of the Sea-and that :-.e teste d
t he evidence and exhibit s"' i nc l udi n g primary sour c es of reference, b y wh e t:-.er they
c oincide d with Fulton's view s.

See Report at 25-2 6 .

The States argue t h a t the

oppo site approa c h i s the c or r ect one, i.e., that se c ondary sources illlJI:st be t ested
by the pr i ma r y evidence.

F urthe rmore, the States assert, Fulton, a ltho us:<'1 a

signific ant source ,, is at va riance with the evidence and with the weight o f s cholarshi p on two po int s central to t h e St a tes 1 c ase:

(1) the claim that Englis,h l a v:· prior

t o 1 6 0 3 fa iled to recogni ze m ar i time sovereignty and dominion and (2) the cla im that
the a dmitted 1 7th c entury l egal r ecognition there of v anished after 16 88.

T 1: ey seek

to discredit F ulto n by noti ng that his treatise was w ritten at the height of p o pularity
of the f reedom - of-the- seas do ctrine, a doctrine o f which, the States claim , F ulton
was a zealous advoc ate .
The SG r e pli es t hat the Master's use of Fulto n's text was entirely pr o?e r:

( 1)

that c ontrar y t o the State s 1 contention, the Master studied the primary s our ce
mate r ials and di d not re ly exclusively upon secondary materials; (2) that

F·~1 1ton

drew upon most, i f not all, of the relevant prima r y evidence introduce b y b e States
and t h e Mast er was e n t itl ed to compare his own p reliminary understanding of that
evidence with the v i e ws expressed by Fulton and o thers; and (3) that as t he

~f aster

noted, Fulton1 s work i s generally regarded as per h aps the single most a uL: o ritati ve
study of pre-ninete enth century English maritime claims, that even the State s' chi ei
witness, Professor Jessup, praised the Fulton te x t, and that the States' t ::en1selves
have relied upon Fulton throughout the litigation.
Addressing the specific historical findings o f the Master: I.

The St ate s argue

that the evidence massively supports their claim that English law and pra cti ce prior
to the 17th century recognized the sovereignty a nd ownership by the C ro \v!l

- 11 of the English Seas and the resources thereof.

The States argue that the so·.·ereign'::;

claimed by the Crown was complete territorial sovereignty.

They

cite~

inter alia, .

a 14th century statute referring to "the sea or elsewhere within the realm 11 ; the

11

£1;:.~

.salute 11 requiring foreign ships sailing in the claimed English '.Vaters to stri}<e their
sails to English ships; the Crown 1 s assertion of and exercise oi the right to grant
exclusive fisheries in these

seas~

including title to sedentary fisheries; the Crown1 .;;

asserted rights to flotsam, jetsam and lagan; and establish English law, co:J.trary t::
Roman law, which held that a new island rising in the claimed seas belongs :o the
Crown on the theory that the Crown had owned the land while still covered w:..th
water.
The United States replies that the States' contentions are based upon a confusic:::.
between maritime sovereignty and seabed owner ship.
SG contends that the Crown 1 s claimed

Jl

11

As found by the Master, the

sovereignty 11 over the adjacent seas -;:;·as a

limited one, that England exercised only a protective jurisdiction for the pt.:rpose c:
protecting commerce.

As evidence that the seas were never considered

wit~in

the

realm under British law, the SG cites a 1389 statute which pro\·ided that the admir::- 1
shall "not meddle from henceforth of anything done within the realm, but only of
a thing done upon the sea.

11

He argues that this statute, together with other sourc o::: s,

has long been understood as circumscribing the English realm, in a property-law
sense~

by inland waters and the low-water line.

of ownership.

The SG refutes the States 1 evider:;: e

He contends that the "flag salute" was merely an attribute o:

?rotec:~·.-e

jurisdiction and that the Crown's prerogative rights to royal fish, flotsam etc. are
merely examples of the Crown 1 s overriding rights in owner-less prope.rty :ound by
its subjects.

He contends that there is no evidence of Crown grants of excbsive

fisheries after 1215 and that the jurisdiction exercised over fis::U.ng after tl:a t date
related primarily to inland waters.

' f

II.

All parties agree that during the Stuart era (1603-1688), the Crown asserted

general sovereignty over the English seas, including a claim to the ownership of the
seabed.

The parties disagree, however, as to the grounds on which that sove reignty

rested.

The States argue that the Crown's claims were based upon a theory of inherent

sovereign ownership in the coastal state extending seaward to 100 miles.

They rely

on the writings of commentators of that p eriod and the testimony of their principle
witness,

Professor Jessup.

They also cite a 1909 decision of the Permanent Court

of Arbitration which appears to recognize that maritime territory "is an essential
appurtenance of land territory.

11

The SG argues, however, that the States 1 theory

has no historical foundation and is refute d by the very extravagance of the Stuart
claims to the Bay of Biscay and the North Sea, which denied to France, Spain and
the North Sea nations any corresponding sovereign maritime rights.

Noting that the

Stuart era proved to be the high tide of British maritime pretensions, the SG relies
on the finding of the Master that the Stuart claims were based upon effective occupation of the seas through British naval power.

He maintains that even during this

period the adjacent seas were never considered to be within the realm of England.
He cites a 1876 English case, Regina v. Keyn, in which Lord Chief Justice Cockburn
demonstrated that the courts of admiralty had never had territorial jurisdiction to
try a foreigner for a crime committed on a foreign ship on the seas over which
England claimed "sovereignty.

11

The parties also disagree as to whether or not t'he Stuart pretensions were
abandoned during the 18th century.
that they were.

As found by the Master, the United States argues

Depreciating the evidence offered by the States to the contrary, the

SG argues that the "flag salute" had become largely ceremonial and that the evidence
concerning the regulation of foreign fishing appears to pertain only to inland waters
or shallow coastal seas.

With respect to the latter, the SG notes that Professor Jessup

has shown that England claimed no exclusive fisheries beyond three miles from

.~

.

- 13 -.
shore at the end of the 18th century.

And~

in a:1y event, the SG woulC. rely on his

earlier argument that a claim to exclusive fisr_eries would have been ':lased upon
appropriation of those fisheries through occupation and
territorial ownership.

use~

not upo:: a theory of

The SG notes that Blac::Zstone did recognize t:::e Stuart theory

of seabed ownership as a possible basis for a Crown claim of owners:-:_i p of emergeC.
lands, but contends that he was uncertain of tte soundness of that theory.
III.

Noting the above Stuart claims, the C.e£endant States argue

:~at

given this

legal and political climate in which the colonia l charters were issueC., it would have
been

11

incredible 11 if the colonies they created :-_ad not been granted sea and seabed

rights.

They argue that in view of the Stuart claims it stands to reason that simila:::-

claims would have been made on this side of t:-:e Atlantic.

They rely on the te stimo:1y

of the expert witnesses, treaties and maps purportedly demonstrati::.g English clair:-_s
to the marginal seas of the North American colonies.

They also note two of the

c olonial charters 1 the second Virginia charter of 1609 and the New :=:::ngland charter
of 1620, as conveying "all the Islands lying ..,,·ithin one hundred Miles along the Coast

. . • Together with all the Soils,

Grounds • • • :\,fines . • • as other

1.~:.:-terals . • •

wit::.:n

the said Territories • • • whatsoever 1 and thereto and thereabouts by Sea and Land,
being, or in any sort belonging or appertaini:1g • • • •

"and~

with respect to the

New England colony's boundaries, ''by all the Breadth afore said thr 0ughout the Ma:.::-1
Land, from Sea to

Sea~

with all the Seas, Ri\·ers, Islands, Creeks, Inlets, Forts.

shall be the Limits and Bounds • • • of the second Colony • • • " and t=:e granting
language of "Mines, and Minerals • • • both ..,..,.:.thin the same Trail o: Land upon the
Main, and also within the said Islands and Seas adjoining.

11

Contra :-v to the conclu-

sion of the Master, the States find the above l anguage explicit enouE;h to convey
.\

sovereignty and dominion in the colonial seas.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.)

They argue that in

~-~ artin

v. Wadce ll,

367 (1842) 7 and Shirley v. Bowbly, 152 U.S. 1-t, 16 (1844), the

Court expressly relied on the "royalties" language of the charters as including a

conveyance of the soil under all navigable waters, without making any dis tine tion
between inland waters and the rnarginal sea.

The States go on to cite, inter alia,

''free fishing" clauses found in some of the charters and maps made in the co loni al
period showing boundarie s extending out i nto the sea.

The United States contenc s that Britain paid little or no attention to, and express e::
little or no intere st in c laimi:1g sovereignty over, the Arne ric an seas.

The SG argues

that a prope r reading of the c!:arter s shows no explicit grant of the seas or seabed
but rather that while they gra:1ted lands and islands outright, they granted only
ri ghts short of ownership in t:,.e seas.

certa~::

By contrast, the SG notes that the Ca:1adian

c olonial charters purported to make outright grants of the sea.

He further contends

that since the charters on which the States rely specifically enumerated many prerogatives, such as fishings a.::1d precious stones, but did not specifically enun1 erate
ownership of the seas o r seabed as a prerogative, such ownership did not pass to
the colonies.

In any event,

t~e

SG returns to his interpretation that the Stuart clain:

to sovereign ownership of the seas could be achieved, if at all, only throug h occupat: o:;
and use, and argues that there is no evidence of such occupation and use in the area
of the seas now at issue.

He reasons that while limited e'.-i dence of American

colon:.c..~

fishing is insufficient to establish such a claim, it, in any event, demonstrates only
an occupation of shallow coastal waters.

Finally, the United States contends that

the colonial charters did not in practice grant proprietary interests; rather, they
granted opportunities to establish settlements and appropriate lahds, toget!:er with
sufficient authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of thos e
settlements.

Accordingly, the SG contends, any rights to the adjacent seas and sea ·:;.::'

that passed under the grants and charters did so as incidents of government.

And

- 1.

c::.--

colonial governmental powers had reverted to the Crown before independence.
IV.

The defendant States also except to the Master 1 s finding that if the colonies

had a claim to the seabed, t h at claim would have passed to the United States at inde-

pendence or upon ratification of the Constitution.

The States argue that at inde-

pendence each State became a complete sovereign, recognized as such b:,· both our
law and by international law.

They contend that under the constitutional l aw of the

.revolutionary period the United States was not regarded as a separate e::::.ty distinguished from the States, but rather as the States themselves, acting i:1 confederation
or concert for the winning of the war.

They cite insta:J.ces where the Sta:es were

individually recognized in treaties, and individually carried on substantia l foreignaffairs and defense activities.

They also argue that Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2

of the Constitution itself refutes any claim that it trans: erred sub silent: o any territor y
or property from the States to the federal government.

Finally, they co::::.tend that

throughout our history down to the Court's decision in California it was -v:ell understood that under the Constitution the States retained the i r rights in the rr..arginal seas
and seabed.

They here rely principally on Follard 1 s Lessee and its progeny.

They

·"'--...-

(,

note the Court 1 s admission in California that in reasserting the basic doctrine of
Pollard, the Court had used language strong enough to indicate a belief
not

on~y

t~at

the states

owned tidelands and soil under navigable inland waters, but also owned soils

under all navigable waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether :.:1land or not.
332 U.S. at 36.

See Manchester v. Massachusetts, 13 9 U.S. 240 (1891 ).

The United States argues that it was created upon i:J.dependence as c. single nation
and was recognized as such under international law and, accordingly, a:::.y seabed
ownership rights previously held either by the Crown or by the colonies would have
passed to the United States as an incident of external so...-ereignty.

The SG argues that

while the United States has never denied that the States exercised inter:::.c.l s·o vereignty
upon independence, they were never external sovereigns.

He argues t:::.c.: the history

of the Continental Congress shows _that a national government possessir:;.g the attributes
of sovereignty came into being prior to the states.

The SG cites an ear:v decision of

this Court, Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Da •• ) 53 (17<?5), as finding t:::at ''the

states, individually, were no t known nor recognized as sove:-e i gn, by foreign
nations . • • •

11

He also

re l.~ es

on United States v. Curtiss-·.•;·::- i ght Export C o rp.,

2 99 U.S. 304 (1936), wher e th e Court found that "[a] sa res :_:2t of the separa ti on
from Great B ritain• • • the ?Owers of external so v ereignty :;; ::. s sed from the Crown
n o t t o the c o l onies

severa ll~.- ,

but to the colonies in their

c a pacity as the United State s of America.

11

c o:.~ ec tive

and corp o rate

And., in any e ve:::, the SG ma i n t a i ns t he.:

such so v ereignty would ha ve passed to the United States up o:: ratification o f t}·_ e
Con s ti tution in that the Co :: s titution confirmed that the Uni te:: States posses sed all
a ttributes of e xternal sove :-e i gnty.

r·.-,

He contends that Art.

n o t i ntended to affect the d : s t ribution of incidents of

exter nc.~

Sect. 3, Cl. 2 w as
s overei g nty, s t.:ch as

a n inhere n t sovereign own e ::-ship of the adjacent seas and s e::.·b ed.
V.

The States argue t::-..at the adoption by the United Stc. :e s of a three -mil e

ter ritor i a l sea did not wor ::: a contraction of any existing Stc.:e s 1 rights and t::at
even if exc lusive rights to :be outer continental shelf are d e

~.m ed

to have ar i sen in

1 9 45 for the first time, t he States would be entitled to thos e ri ghts.

They ar gu e

t h a t they are entitled to ha·,·e their rights measured by inte ::-.::.a tional law as it exis ts
t oday .

And that, in any e ,·e nt, an overwhelming preponde r -::..::.c e of authority c onfir=:s

t hat the t hree-mile limit related fundamentally to surface r:.::. Yigation and re l ated
rig ht s; and i ts basic ratio .::.c.le could not affect the historic
develop the m i neral reso u :- c es of the seabed.

Repeating

-=~aims

H-- ~~ r

of the Sta t es to

historic ar gur.:: ents ,

the States further maintai.::. that even if rights in the shelf c. ::- .:> se in 1945 for th e fir s :
time, they are unquestio n a .;)ly the residual owners of prope::- :·y within their l a::1d
t er r itor ie s to which the c o.::ti nental- shelf rights are an "irL::.-=- rent" appurtenan ce.
Arguing that it is cl e ar that the federal goverrunent c a.::., i n the conduct of t h e
nation's foreign affairs, ac ju st national territorial
territory of a state, the S G

c~ntends

bounda r~e s

and in doin g so ce de

that adoption by the l ·::i t ed States of a three-

mile territorial se.a not oc:-.... y renounced the States preexi s L::og claitns, if any, to t.:-. .::

seas and seabe d beyond; it also foreclosed any such claims from subsequently
arising.

The SG further argues that the States' contention that the rights created

by t he Truman Proclamation of 1945 vested in them as residual owners of the
adjacent lands is inconsistent with this Court's constitutional deterrnination in
.California that, in the absence of proof of

val~d

historic title in the States, owner-

ship of the seabed of the adjacent seas inheres in the United States as the external
sovereign.
VI.

Finally., the States claim that at the very least., they are entitled to prove

historic bounda ries out to three leagues on the Same basis as the Gulf States are
under the Subme rged Lands Act.

They contend that this difference in treatment

violates the equal footing doctrine.

The SG notes that this claim was expressly

rejected in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
C..

North Carolina specifically excepts to the Master 1 s determination that the

States of Rho de Island and North Carolina were not wholly independent nations and
did not have external sovereignty during the period be tween the operative date of the
federal government under the Constitution and the subsequent dates when they ratified
the Constituti on.

North Carolina argues that such a finding is contrary to the evidence

a nd notes, inter alia, that early acts of Congress placed North Carolina and Rhode
Island on the same footing as foreign countries.

The SG relies on the findings of the

Special Master that there is no evidence that either of the two States had withdrawn
from the union formed by the Articles of Confederation, that Congress recognized
them as a part of the United States and., in fact, in its legislation distinguished them
from. foreign states.
D.

Georgia specifically excepts to the Ma ster 1 s conclusion that the State did

not acquire the resources of the seabed under its boundary settlement of 1802 with
the United States.

Georgia argues that such a finding is contrary to the evidence,

noting that the Cession Agreement quitclaimed to Georgia "any lands lying within

the United States" lying east of tbe States 1 western boundary.

The SG aga1n relles

· on the finding of the Master that even if the agreement were construed to grant title

to the seabed off Georgia 1 s coast, in 1802 the United States did not claim any jurisdiction over or title to the seabed of the c ontinental shelf beyond the three-mile belt
of territorial sea.
Eo

The Special Mast e r found tha t it does not appear that any exploration or

exploitation has been carrie d on by the licensee of Maine or that any payn>e nts ha\-e
been made by it to tha t Sta te, and that an accounting is not required.

I\o exceptions

are taken to this finding.
F.

Amicus Special C ommittee on Tidelands notes the State s 1 economic and

environmental inter ests in exploitation of the shelf.

They attempt to demonstrate

that unless they are to obtain t he licensing fees, taxes etc. from such exploitation 1
they will get the shor t end of the stick 1 paying out in services n>ore than they will

('-

take in in the taxation of spin-off development.
take no position in the litigation.

Amicus As so cia ted Gas Distributors

They note the urgent need for fuel and, in essence 1

urge everyone to get on with deciding the case.

In particular 1 they note the likelihoo d

of extended litigation betwe en the States as to the extent of State boundaries if the
· States win and urges the Court to retain jurisdiction until all boundary disputes are
resolved.
DISCUSSION:
appear futile.

The defendant States• attempts to distinguish-or limit-California

And 1 the Court 1 s historical findings there speci fic ally and clearly

refute those now advanc ed by the Atlantic States,

~:

"From all the wealth of materia 1 supplied • • • we
cannot say that the thirteen ori gina l colonies
separately acquired ownership to the three-mile
belt or the soil under it . • • • 11 332 at 31.
I

\.._

"Neither the English charters granted to this
nation's settlers, nor the treaty of peace with
England, nor any other docum.ent to which we
have been referred, showed a purpose to set

apart a three-mile ocean belt 1or colon1a1 or state
ownership. rr 332 U.S. at 32.
"There is no substantial support i n history ::":>r the
idea that [the settlers] wanted or claimed a :::-ight to
block off the ocean's bottom for ~Jrivate owr.:.er s hip
and use in the extraction of its \"':e alth. 11 332 at
32-33.
"Not only has acquisition . • • o f the three- r.:-_:.}e belt,
been accomplished by the natio nal Governrr.e:1t, but
protection and control of it has bee n and is c. fu nction
of national external sovereignty . 11 332 U. S . at 34.
The Courtt s focus on the three -mile belt would not appec. r of any releva :1ce and, in
any event, Louisiana clearly extended these findings

be~.·ond

that limit.

=:

tlle

historical analysis in California is weak, it is weak wit:. respect to the S:c.tes 1 claims
to external sovereignty at independence.

A recent arti cle by Professor

Columbia deals extensively with that claim and is
government.

stror:~

~.~or ris

of

support for the :ecie ral

Morris, The Forging of the 1:...-nion Recons :.dered:

A Histor :cal

Refutation of State Sovereignty Over Seabeds, 74 Colurr_ , L. Rev. 1056 (Oct . 1974).
Gouverneur Morris contends that the historical evidence indicates that a
goverprnent was in operation before the formation of t he states.
agency theory advanced by the States by no ting that

de le~a tes

~tional

He re ft:te s the

to the Firs : Co ntinental

Congress were selected in disregard of colonial as serr.·::: li es and by other ext ralegal
means.

It should also be noted, perhaps, that Fulton is cited extensive 1~.-

the California opinion and that the Court in California

s~ecifically

:~roughout

limits "'?Plication

of the rationale of Pollard, Manchester and other ear l:: c ases.
Although it is not clear what part the io reign-affa i : :- s and defense

p ov::e :::-s

rationale played in the California Court's a!lalysis, th e Court seems to. :_c.--.-e in any
event rejected the preemptive powers argwne nt now ac·: a nced by the de :'"e::ca nt States.
The States 1 historical arguments appear lar g ely repet i::....- e and althoug h t::-_ey make
much of it, the nature of their additional eYidence is not clear.

In any e...-ent, there

'

'

would appear to be no "clear error" in the California :'1olding and fhe SG' s sugg-e"'Snon
that there be no departure from the doctrine of stare decisis seems persuasive.
Finally~

pleadings 9

there is the federal government's pendi ng motion for judgment on t:'1e
The Court's intent in the matter is not clear.

There is a reply brief.

2/5/75
PJN

Ginty

Orig, 35
USA
v.

MAINE, et al.

The defendant States N (one of which is

Virginia~

request

that the Court allocate four hours for argument of this case.
They assert that it is extremely complex, both legally and
historacaly, and claim that that mush time is required for
proper presentation of the issues.They further point out that
the Court gave the Railroad Act three hours and assert
that this case is equally important and more complicated.
The ultimate issue here air &LX is described to be ownership
of the resources of the outer continental shelf from Maine to
Georgia.
There is no way to make anything more than a guess about
the amount of time required. My general skepticism toward
\. prompts me o ec.ormnend two hours rather than four. )
the fruitfulness of oral argumen ~ . The parties assert tliat
there are some issues that are distinct among them as well as
come issues that they share in common. I would think that an hour
on each side should allow the presentation of all of the issues,

BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ron Carr

DATE:

February 24, 1975

No. 35, Original - United States v. Maine, et al.

I recorrnnend that you vote to enter judgment for the
United States in accordance with the Special Master's recommended
decree, although on the basis of reasoning somewhat at variance
with that of the Special Master.
I think it might be helpful briefly to outline the
legal contours of the problem, if only to clarify the following
discussion.

In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,

the Court held that, as between the state and national governments,
the latter holds title to submerged lands seaward of the lew
water mark on the coastline.

California had argued that its

state constitution, adopted contemporaneously to its admission,
defined the state's boundary as three English miles seaward
of the low water mark.

Moreover, the eleven original riparian

•k

states, when they formed the union, assertedly had

propriet~ry

* I.e c, all thirteen original stat es, except for
Connecticut-and Pennsylvania, plus Maine. Neither Connecticut
nor Pennsylvania has an Atlantic coastline (Connecticut fronts
Long Island Sound; Pennsylvania the upper Delaware River).

2.

rights out to the three-mile limit bounding the territorial
seas.

Since California, like all states, was admitted on

an equal footing to the thirteen original states,
rights must be the same.

i~proprietary

The Court rejected these arguments.

It found that, when the union was formed, the boundaries of

-

the original riparian states extended only to the low water
...____

-

mark and that extension of the national boundaries to the threemile mark occurred, under international law, only thereafter.
Hence, regardless of how state boundaries might be defined,
the United States, rather than the states, held title to the
submerged lands under the peripheral territorial seas.

The

territorial seas were acquired by the United States and not only
the seas but the lands beneath them pertained to the external
sovereignty of the nation.
In U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 669 (Louisiana I) and
U. S. v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, the Court held that, given its
holding in California, it followed a fortiorari that title
to submerged lands beyond the three mile limit was in the
United States.

Finally, in U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, the

Court dealt with the construction of the Submerged Lands Act.
That Act, passed in response to the decisions described above,
confirmed in all riparian states boundaries out to three
geographical miles from the low water mark and, in Gulf of
Mexico states, boundaries out to three leagues, if those states
could prove that such boundaries had received congressional

3.

recognition when they were admitted to the union.

In addition,

Congress ceded to the riparian states all of the United States'
interest in the submerged lands within the states' boundaries.
With this background in mind, I think it clear that
the defendant states can succeed here only if California was
wrong.

In other words, they could succeed only if each of the

following propositions is correct.

(1)

That from the

inception of English colonization of this continent until

........_

independence, England had, under international law, title
to the submerged lands underlying the seas adjacent to the
continent, from the low water mark out to a point beyond the
three mile limit of the subsequently recognized territorial seas.
(2)

That England's title to the submerged lands was granted

to the riparian colonies in their colonial charters.

(3)

That,

upon independence, title to the submerged lands remained in
the new riparian states rather than passing to the United
States collectively.

(4)

That, upon ratificat i on of the

Constitution, title remained in the riparian states rather
than passing to the United States collectively.

(5)

That

such title was unaffected by the subsequent recognition of
the United States of territorial seas limited to three miles
from the low water mark.
I think that the critical questions here are the
first two, for the following reasons.

c==::: ::>-

If, in point of inter-

national law, the riparian states held title to the submerged

4.
lands out to some distance on the continental shelf, I do
not see how such title could be said to have passed to the
United States collectively.

It is true that under both the

Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, such submerged
lands would, in a sense, be affected with the external
sovereignty of the nation.

There is, I would think, no

question that the United States could regulate their use,
make treaties as to them, and so forth.

But I don't see

----

how these acknowledged foreign affairs, defense, and admiralty
powers of the United States require that the nation, rather
than states, must have proprietary title to the lands.

As

Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his dissent in California,
there is a distinction between imperium and dominium; while
the United States necessarily has the former, it does not
follow that it has the latter.
II

'\

The critical question, then, is whether and to what
extent the original riparian states held title to the submerged
they declared independence from England.
he question cannot be alone what England claimed as its
property, but what was recognized as such in international law,
i.~.,

the practice and acquiescence of the family of nations.

Moreover, whatever England might have claimed in the seventeenth
~

centuryA whatever property rights the colonies might have had
were subject to defeasance by the British Government.

Thus if,

5.

as of 1776, the British Government no longer claimed title
to the submerged lands, no such title could have remained in
or passed to the colonies upon independence.
Under this analysis, much of the Common Counsel
states' historical material is irrelevant.

From the relevant

materials, it seems to me clear that the Special Master's
critical conclusion is correct:

that, as of 1776, international

law recognized in England (and hence its North American colonies)
proprietary rights only in those submerged lands adjacent
to the shores actually occupied or employed by the colonies
or their citizens; at...____
most, the colonies had proprietary rights
to submerged lands under the territorial seas,

i.~.,

those

within "cannon shot" or three miles from shore.
If this conclusion is correct, then it is clear that
under international law any dominion over the submerged lands
of the continental shelf, beyond three miles from the low
water mark, did not arise until after independence.

Indeed,

from all indications, it did not arise until the Truman
Proclamation following the Second World War, the principles
of which were accepted by other nations in the Convention on
the Continental Shelf (See Government's Brief at 56).

Thus,

the continental shelf submerged lands were incorporated into
th:_United States only

~ubse9¥ent

to independe? ce, by means

of exercise of the national foreign affairs and military powers.

6.

As such, the submerged lands - like all "after-acquired"
territories - are subject exclusively to the control of the
United States and are within the national domain.
It seems to me unnecessary to go beyond this
analysis to sustain the Special Master's reconnnended judgment.
The states'

11

epal footing" argument - that they, like the

Gulf states, should be allowed to establish historic boundaries
out to three leagues,-seems to me without merit for the
reasons given in the United States' brief, at 57-59.

No. 35 Orig.
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Lawmaking for the Seas
by John R. Stevenson

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea is engaged in a monumental task-nothing
short of drafting a constitution for the oceans that will
gain the support of the world's nations. The first
substantive session of the conference has been
concluded, and the second will open next month in
Geneva. Several new approaches to international
lawmaking are being used.

THE THIRD United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea held its first substantive session last summer in Caracas from June 20 to August 29, and a second substantive session is scheduled to meet for eight
weeks in Geneva commencing on March 17 of this year.
The fundamental task of thi~ conference, which many
consider the most important international lawmaking
conference since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, is to agree on a legal regime governing
the activities of men and nations on more than two
thirds of the surface of the world. The results of the
first substantive session of the conference and the
prospects for agreement have been reported in hearings before congressional committccs 1 and in other
journals 2 Rather than essentially repeating those reports, this artick focuses on the law of the sea negotiations as an example of the international lawmaking
process and on those aspects of the process that appear
to be most constructive in facilitating agreement on a·
constitution for the oceans.
Why do wc need international lawmaking for the
seas? Considcration t)f this basic question resolves itself into two subqucstinns: Why do we need any legal
rcgimc for the ocean , <lnd why is it necessary to have
a system of intcrnational as opposed to national law
for this vast area of the world?
The answer to the first is merely a varinnt of the
basic pnliticnl theory and jurisprudential inquiry as to
why we need law at all: As long as nations and their
nationnls w.c thi~ vast nrc<J and exploit its resources.
there lllUS( be CCrtnin agreed principJcs of COIH]Uct to
resolve competing uses and conflicts. Otherwise there
will be chaos.

But why is international rather than national Ia\\'
making necessary?
.•
This is a more comp!Gx issue. One possibilit) would
havo been to extend tho national state system
established in the seventeenth century to embrace the seas as well as the land territory of the world.
This, in fact, was attempted, with brief pcri,Kls of vary ing success, by those countries that sought to establish
maritime empires with the same sovereignty over the
seas as they had on Janel. Because of the desires , however, of other states to navigate freely and to cn rry on
naval and commercial activities throughou t th e oce an ~
without seeking the consent of a territoria l sm ercign .
the extension of coastal slate territorial sovereignty was
limited by and large to a fairly narrow belt of territorial
sea that ranged until very recent history be.tween three
and twelve miles. In the area beyond the intcrnatiu:wl
regime freedom of the seas was firmly estahlishecl.
This regime excluded national sovereignty over the
ocean and permitted everyone the free usc of the
seas and their resources, providing they showccl reason able regard for the interests of others in thcir exercise
of this freedom.
This simple, comprehensive rule of intcrnationul hm·
served the in!ernational community well for more than
three centuries. Tt reflected the general interest in free
common utilization of the ocean, at Icast on the part
of those countries with the national power to c:1forec
this rule and the apparent inexhaustability of the
. principal ocean resource-fish. Moreover, while thi~
basic constitutional provision was a rule of customar~
intern;:!tional law 'only finally codified in the 1958 High
Seas Convention, the constitutional allocation of powers
provided for a large measure o( national juri~diction
through the establishment of the principle of flag state'
control over vessels navigating the high seas.
Commencing at the end of World War I I. howevcr.
this established constitutional scheme for the oceanfreedom of the high seas beyond a narrow territorial sea
with (lag state control over vessels on the high seashas been widely challengcd 011 the ground that it IH'
longer serves the needs of the international communit~.
I. I It' a ring' hl'IPIT Sl·natc Fnr •.:ign RL'lat ion~ Committ e ~..· o n "i L·p t~o:m h n "
1974. SuhcnmmitllT on M i n~..·r:d ... , ~1:tiLTi:ll:-. and FuL·I.., of SL'Il :t ll ltl!L' r i\'!
nnd ln~td:tr (LHtttnitltT nn Scptcrn!wr 17, I 1J74, llou~l· {)f \{Lptr ,t· rn :tt in ·,
M(' tTllanl Ma1 inc :rnd l'i -. lu.:r iL'" CummitiL'L' nn Sl· ptvlllhl' l 2S. J(l74 . :uHI
IIOLIO..,L' of Rl'ptL' ~L· ntativL·~ Forct~·n Affai1..., Commiltt:c on 1\:t i\L'Inhl.·r I ~.J.

1974.
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The explanation for this chalien'ge has many aspects.
In the first place, a kchnological explosion has increa.scJ and intensified the uses of the ocean. The
traditional uses-navigation and fishing- are now carried on in entirely new types of ships and cquipment500,000-ton supertankers, nuclear-powered and armed
submarines, and factory fishing vessels equipped with
electronic tracking gear. There arc also vast increases
in the numbers and tonnage of vessels and economic
effort devoted to these traditional uses to the point
that the world today faces a very serious problem of
congestion and navigational safety in important shipping routes, over fishing and depletion of fish stocks,
and pollution of the ocean.
We also have many entirely new uses of the ocean:
exploitation of the world's most important new sources
of petroleum in the continental margins of the world,
as well as the nickel, copper, and other hard minerals
soon to be produced from manganese nodules from the
deep ocean seabed; intensified scientific research adding to our knowledge not only of the oceans but also
of our climate and the planet as a whole; and increasingly diversified recreational uses of the ocean and
its beaches.
The failure of the traditional freedom-of-the-seas
principle to deal adequately with coastal states' concerns for the utilization of the oceans and their resources beyond a narrow territorial sea has led to a
renewal of the seventeenth-century attempt to extend
the national state system to the oceans-this time
through coastal state claims of territorial sovereignty
extending beyond twelve and up to two hundred miles.
At the same time the maritime countries, which for
so long upheld the freedom-of-the-seas principle through
force, if necessary, have become increasingly inhibited
by limitations in the U.N. Charter and other treaties
on the use of force, as well as the high political cost in
terms of alliance policies and other foreign policy objectives, in restricting coastal state claims through the
application of force.
Finally, the sharp increase in the number of national
states from some fifty at the time of the founding of
the United Nations to roughly a hundred and fifty
toda) has increased the demand for a fundamental remolding of the law of the sea to take into greater
account the interests of the developing and newly independent countries, a demand that the increasing role
of ·.international organizations, based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all states, has made increasingly difficult for the major maritime and developed ·tatcs to ignore.
The net result, in the absence of international agreement. has been a spiral of competing and escalating
claims to the use of the same ocean space and resources,
F l" ITO R's ...,.OTE: The views ~xprc sscd arc tho ~c o f tl1c author and do not
re prc'\ent the views or the l)cpanrnent of State or the United
Suit e ' gove rnment. This article has been adapted hy the author from his
remar k' at the Princeton Univcr~ity Confcrcnc(' on ''A New World Order,"
N \H ~mb cr , 1974.
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and thi~ has rcsui't'C"d in increasing conflict and disorder.
The Law of the Sea Conference may be viewed in this
context as the international community's best and perhaps last opportunity to arrest this new extension of
the national state system and reach an agreed international solution that will avoid conflict over unilateral
claims and an ultimate partition of the ocean.
Granted the necessity of achieving promptly a new
constitution for the ocean, how can this best be
achieved? In the present stage of development of the
international community the only three ·alternatives
would appear to be: the traditional customary lawmaking process involving changes accomplished principally
through the unilateral assertion of claims that other
states accept or acquiesce in over time; the international, multilateral lawmaking treaty process in which
the Law of the Sea Conference is engaged; and finally
the establishment of a new international organization
with the authority to enact and enforce binding legislation for ·the ocean.
The difficulty with the customary lawmaking process
as applied to today's ocean is not only the inevitable
conflict that is produced by differing perceptions of
legal rights and national interests but also the inability
to make satisfactory functional accommodations between competing claims for the use of the same ocean
space. It is my view, shared by many other participants in the law of the seas negotiations, that, in the
absence of a generally accepted international agreement, the most likely result will be the extension of the
national state system to the high seas through the establishment of territorial seas of two hundred miles or
more, with no provision for freedom of navigation or
overflight beyond twelve miles or for unimpeded transit
of straits. This would be accompanied by continuing
conflict with respect to national claims to the use of
the ocean in the area beyond, including the exploitation of the deep seabed's resources.
While this outcome would give coastal states the
control they seek over coastal resources, pollution, and
scientific research, it would seriously prejudice all states'
navigational interests in unimpeded transit of straits
and in using the one third of the ocean that would be
overlapped by two-hundred-mile territorial seas, as well
as their interests in distant water resource exploitation,
scientific research, and effective international pollution
standards for the ocean. It is simply not possible
through unilateral customary lawmaking to achieve a
functional accommodation of interests through a twelvemile territorial sea accompanied by an economic zone
extending to two hundred miles in which the inter.ests
of coastal states in controlling resources, participating
in scientific research, and preventing pollution, and the
interests of all states in free navigation and overflight,
promotion of scientific research, and other high seas
uses aro reconciled through a balance of obligations,
cnforce::~ble through compulsory dispute settlement.
Unilateral international lawmaking favors the blunt
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than a delicate adjustment in <H.:cordancc with functional needs.
At the other 0xtrcmc. the international community
clearly docs not seem any more prepared in the ocean
lh<ln in other areas to deal with thl\ problem by the
fundamental reordering of the national state system that
would be entailed in the establishment of an international organization with the general power to enact and
enforce the necessary substantive rules. In some limited
areas, however, the establishment of an international
organization with carefully prescribed rule-making authority and a balanced decision-making process, taking
into account not only the numbers of sovereign states
involved but other important factors as well, appears
to be a necessary supplement to a comprehensive international treaty.
If a comprehensive multilateral treaty appears to be
the best, if not the only, viable solution to lawmaking
for the oceans, what lessons do the law of the sea
negotiations hold for the achievement of a treaty?
One of the first issues to be resolved was the nature
of the treaty. Shortly after the United Nations General
Assembly in 1967 turned to the consideration of the
problems of a legal regime for the deep seabed by
establishing a special committee, the Soviet Union
began exploring the possibility of resolving the principal question on which the 1958 and 1960 Law of the
Sea Conferences failed to reach agreement-the breadth
of the territorial sea. It was encouraged in its belief
that agreement might be possible by the willingness of
the United States (in a change from its position at the
earlier conference) to agree to a twelve-mile territorial
sea, provided free transit through, over, and under
straits used for international navigation was guaranteed.
Both countries recognized that general agreement on a
twelve-mile territorial sea would require some recognition of preferential fishing rights of coastal states beyond twelve miles.
It was the initial position of the United States and
other maritime countries that the law of the sea was
so complex that its many problems could better be
dealt with in what were called "manageable packages"
and that the negotiations with respect to the deep seabed should proceed independently of the negotiations
dealing with the more traditional subjects of the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries. This proposal was
strongly opposed by the developing countries, however.
and they were successful in broadening the General
Assembly's 1970 resolution. which called for a Law
of the Sea Conference, to provid e for a comprehensive
treaty dealing not only with these subjects but also
with pollution, scientific research , and the high seas
and continental shelf regimes. The 1973 General 1\sscmhly resolution fixing the schedule for the conference went even further and tktermined that till' man date of the conference would he "to adopt a convention
dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea
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. . . bearing in mind that the problems of ncc an :,pa~· l
arc closely interrelated and neecl to be co nside red a~
a whole."
Whil e this comprehensive approach ha~ increased
the difficulty of the negotiation s b) increasing the num ·
ber of items with which the conference must deal. it i~
my view that, on balance, it has been a fa\'orablc development facilitating the achievement of gennal agreement.

Countries Now Must Consider the "Package"
In the first place, countries part1c1pating in the negotiations must now consider the entire "pacl..agc·· ol
law-of-the-sea treaty provisions rather than on!~ their
own particular interests in one or more item'. TilL':
must, in effect, accept or reject the treat) as a whok
rather than picking and choosing in accordance ''it h
their special interests.
Second , many of the ostensibly different subject~
involve the usc of the same ocean space. For example.
among the most difficult remaining negotiating i~!'ucs
with respect to lhc nature of the economic zone arc
the accommodation of navigational, economic. scientific, environmental, and national security interc. ts
within that zone.
Finally, the very outlines of the general agreement
on which a consensus appears to be e\'olving also depend on a comprehensive approach. While on the one
hand the United States and other maritime p011 ers arc
unwilling to accept a twelve-mile territorial sea " ·ithnut
concurrent agreement on unimpeded transit of intl'l'national straits, most coastal states arc un11 illing 111
agree to limit coastal state territorial stwcrcignt:- ((1
twelve miles unless they have broad control mer rL' sourccs in an economic zone lJL·yond twclw mik">. :-\nr.
on the other hand , do the d eve loping countrie~ appl'~ l l
willing to agree on the protection of the na,·igatiPnal
interests of maritime countries in the area bc)nnd
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t\\dvc miles and in international straits without concurren t agreement on a deep seabed regime in which
their int c rc~;ts in participation in the "common heritage
L'f t:wnk:nJ" arc recognized.
.-\ s..:cond common assumption in the negotiations
h ~b been thl' de:,irability-indced, in the view of many,
the practical necessity-of achieving very general agreement and not just a majority or even a two- thirds majL~rit;. for the treaty. This was reflected in the gentlemen's agreeme nt to make every effort to reach an accord
Lln substantiw matters by way of consensus. This was
the basis for the adoption of the 1973 General Asscmbl: resolution scheduling the conference. The gentlemen's agreement expressly recognizes "the desirability
of adopting a convention on the law of the sea which
\\ L1uld secu re the widest possible acceptance."
This understanding reflects not only the basic legal
~1 roblcms that would be implicit in a new constitution
for the ocea n .to which a number of important states
UL) not becPmc parties but also the underlying restraint
L~n voting majonttes in treaty-making conferences,
namely, that to be binding on an individual state tho
treaty must be accepted by that state. If important maritime and coastal states do not feel that their interests
hem~ been accommodated adequately in the comprehensi'e treaty, they may refuse to go along and make
n1<:anin~lc~s the voting majorities by which the treaty
ll:'.xts are adopted at the conference.
.-\pa.rt from these general principles, what have been
the specific lawmaking processes followed in the law of
th~ sea negotiations? Prior to the first and second
Law cf the Sea Conferences, a single treaty text was
prepared by the International Law Commission after
l~b~aining the comments of nations on the commission's
Jral't texts. This single text was then discussed, amended. and voted on at the conferences. The third conference ha~ follow ed essentially the reverse procedure.
Tlk· \ aricus national interests and objectives have been
discussed in ge neral terms both in the preparatory committee ;111d conference, with states submitting their comp-?t ing texts on most treaty articles to be considered
b: the conference and its committees and to be reduced
ultim,Hely to a single, approved text.
The difference may be accounted for in part by the
fact that the 1958 conference was a confercn.ce devoted
in many respects to codifying existing law, whereas the
role of the prese nt conference is not only to modernize
codified law in the light of changing circumstances Dnd
fil l in the gaps, such as the breadth of the territorial
,ca. but also to provide progressive development of entirely new law in areas such as the deep seabeds and
the protection of the environment. The process followed
has been somewhat prolonged, particularly as a result
11f unn . .·ce,sary delay in turning to substantive discus<.ions bcc:Hlso of organizational and procedural clis.tgrecnwnts and a carryove r from the General Asse mbly
,1[ man) tactical techniques more appropriate to the
passage of Gene ral Assembly re solutions th:tn inter-
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national lawmaking. But the. general approach has been
appropriate to a lawmaking cl'fort of this nature, an
effort nothing short of adopting a constitution [or the
ocean .
Seabeds Committee Identified National Interests
In view of the vital and diversifi ed national interests
involved, this was not a task that should have been entrusted to legal technicians in the first instance. Before
a precise treaty text could be ge nerally agreed on, it
was clearly necessary for the nations of the world, including the many newly independent ones, to understand the nature of the task and where their respective
national interests lay and to agree on at least the broad
political framework of a generally acceptable agreement.
This has been achieved in the preparatory work of the
United Nations Seabeds Committee and in the general
debate and committee discussions last stimmer at Caracas. Most countries have indicated a clear appreciation of their national interests, and there appears to be
broad general support in favor of a comprehensive
treaty based on a twelve-mile territorial sea, a coastal
state economic zone of two hundred miles, and an international regime and authority for the exploitation of
the mineral resources of the deep seabed beyond the
economic jurisdiction of coastal states.
The broad ranging discussions to date·, also have
identified the critical areas of negotiation for achieving
a final agreement: unimpeded transit of international
straits overlapped by a twelve-mile territorial sea; international limitations on coastal state resource jurisdiction
in the economic zone (such as full utilization and conservation obligations with respect to fisheries and some
modest payments with respect to oil production to be
used for internationaL community purposes); the extent of a coastal state's nonresource rights in the economic zone, particularly as to pollution and scientific
research; equitable treatment of landlocked states; and
the extent of the Seab'cd Authority's discretion with
respect to access and regulation of the exploitation of
the hard min erals found in the manganese nodules of
the deep seabed and the role of the authority in that
exploitation.
The success of the Law of the Sea Conference will
depend on its ability to resolve these difficult remaining issues and translate the emerging consensus into
generally acceptable detail ed treaty provisions. This
in turn will depend in large measure on the willin gness
of governments to make a number of hard decisions
on the critical issues rem aining and to give their represe ntatives the necessary inst ructions to permit effective
negotiation. The international lawmaking procedures
followed, however, may also contribute to the ultimate
success or failure of the conference. Certain proced ural
aspects of lhe negot iations merit more dct~1iled con-;idcration- (I) dec ision makin g, (2) the role of cornmittces and working grn ups, and ( 3) the establishment
ol' rule --makin g machinery and compulsory dispute
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'>L'ttklllL'llt to deal with '01llL'"'rif the items on the con krenCL''' agenda.
l>cd~ion I\ laking. In connection with the adopt ion
of its ruks of procedure on .June 20, I <)74, by con~cnstls, the conference endorsed the follm\ ing declaraation by it~ president confirming the gentlemen's agrecmcnt on the basis nf which the General Assembly
adopll'd thc resolution schcduling the conference:
Ht.:aring in mind that the problems of ocean -,pact.: arc
closL'Iy 1ntt.:rrelated and need tu be considered as a whole
and the desirability of adopting a Convention on the Law
of the Sea which will secure the widest possible acceptance,
1 he conferenec -,lwuld make every effort to reach
agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus
and there should be no \ oting on such matters until all
efl'orts at LOnsen :-.us ha\e been exhamted.

The rules of proccuure contain certain provtsJons
that may be viewed as an attempt to reconcile the interest in achieving a treaty generally acceptable among
all groups of state<; with the necessity for expeditious
action .
The voting rules that have been used in most United
Natiom lawmaking conferences have provided for decisions on matters of substance in committee by a majority vote of states present and voting and in the full
conference by a two-thirds majority of states present
and voting. Since abstentions arc not counteu, this frequently has permitted the auoption of important rules of
law by a small number of the participating states. The
Law of the Sea Conference rules provide that the twothirus majority in plenary must include at least a majority of the states participating in that session of the conference . They also provide expressly for the adoption
by the same qualificu majority of the text of the convention as a whole in addition to the adoption of individual articles.
Rule 37 of the conference rules sets out a novel procedure in international lawmaking somewhat akin to the
"preliminary question" practice of parliamentary bodies
in determining whether a vote should be taken. Before a
matter of substance is put to a vote, the committee or
the plenary, as the case may be, must decide that all
efforts at reaching agreement have been cxhausteu.
Provision is also made for perious of uelay prior to
making that determination, during which the chairman
or the president arc "to make every effort . . . to facilitate the achievement of general agreement. having
regard to the owr-all progress made on all matters of
substance which aro closely rdatt:d."
The gentlemen's agreement and these rules should
facilitate the achievement of a g nerally acceptable
treaty and at the same time prevent holders of extreme
positions from unduly Lklaying agreement through procedural mancu\ crs.
Agreement hy consensw... while not requiring the
affirmatiw C\prcss app!\l\'al of a tC\t by every participating delegation. docs give any ckkgation that is pre-

p:trcd to stanc 1p and bt: counted thL· r; ght ll' bind.
agrecmcnt. ;\ prm ision to proceed cxclu '>i\ , I ~ b ~ cunsensus would not bc k:1siblc for a subJ eCt a' ~·,11np k \
as the law of the sea, in which so many import ,ull an d
disparatv national interests arc involved . The dt'cL't c1f
the gentlemen's agreement, plus the proccd u1 :d rul, . facilitating a consensus but pro\'iding for reso rt t'' \lltin~
if necessary, should dissuade states that mi ght lhL' their
right to block agreement by consensus from doing SL'
and should cnabk both the committees and the pknar~
to proeecu further by wnsensus than might ha\C bL·cn
thought possible.
The provisions for a preliminary vote on \\ hl'th .: r
efforts to reach general agrccment have bee n e \hau~ted
should bCl ·helpful to thos~ responsible k a dcr~ \\ ho.
while having the necessary voting majori tie -. tl' pu'h
through a particular proposal without am e nJm~ nt.
recognize that to do so would jeopardize the gcn.:ral
acceptance of the treaty and who would prefer w del a)
the vote on a matter of substance until furth n dfLHl'
at reaching agreement have been mauc .., h<?rc h ~l ~ b.:cn
some skepticism cxpresseu that if the vo lLs arc th .: rc.
to carry a particular substantive position , the.') \\ill b-:
used automatically to determine that all c!'fort~ at reaching agreement have been exhausted. But this sJ...eptici,m
docs not seem warrantcu.
One of the most difficult problems of Ia\\ m.tking in
an international community of equal sovereign qa!L'~
with enormous differences in area, p'opulation. rcs,,ur.:~.. '·
and development is the uisproportionatcl) l:ug~· \\1tin,;
power of smaller countries, including man) of thl' ne" I)
independent members of the international n)mmunit~ .
The principal protection against any abus,· L) f the ,ln,·nation, one-vote principle in treaty making is. of cour,c.
the impossibility of binding a dissenting minorit~ tll:lt
refuses to ratify the treaty. The Law of thL' S.:a CL'nt'~..· r
ence has made an important contribution tl) reCl)Ilciling
the one-nation, one-vote principle with the rcaliti-:s ,)f
power and responsibility through procedural inno\ati<'ll'
that strengthen the position of responsible lcadcr,hi~'
in working for a generally acceptable treat~.
Committees and Working Groups. One nf the \1 a~,
the one-nation, one-vote principle has beL'Il pre\ cnt~.· ,!
from ob~tructing effective Ia\\ making has bc~..· n to m.,intain this principle in the plenary organ anu committ~..· ,· ,
of the whole, while prm iding more equitable rep r~..
scnta-tion in smaller committees and othcr subsidi.1n
organs or in a preparatory committee. The rclianCL' 111
the prior conferences on the International Ll\\ C,,mmis~ion was an instance of this techniqu,·. and it h. ,,
been the practice of a number of conkrenc~·s to c~t.il'
lish special committees or working grouJb eon-,istin'-" ,,!
less than the entire membership of the r.;,,nferLIKl'.
The record of the Law of the Sea (\mkrL"nc~.· 111
this area has been somC\\ hat mixed. Th( thre e lll.ti ·
committee;. arc committees of the whok . and in tl,,·
organiz:1ti,,n sc~~ion of the conference there was e<'nsiderablc espousal of the prnposition that in the di~tri
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bution of positions on committees ~limiteJ membersh ip the principle of "one nation, one scat" (taking all
of the committees as a group) should be the logical
corolletry or "o ne nation, one vote." This principle was
watered down in formal confcn~ncc action, however, to
the proposition that no state should be entitled as of
right to membership on more than one limited membe rship comm ittee. In practice, the United States and
the Soviet Union were elected to both the general committee and the drafting committee.
The conference has been reluctant to provide for the
e~tablishment of subsidiary organs, such as working or
drafting groups, composed of less than the entire membership. When smaller groups have been appointed, it
usually has been with the proviso that they be openended in the sense that any state not appointed may
participate in their deliberations as an observer. The
result has been that some of the drafting and negotiating
that could be done most c.ffcctively by smaller bodies of
the conference wilih a representative cross-section of
various geographic and other interest groups have been
conducted by the regional geographic groups in the conference from the U.N. General Assembly.
While these groups have been useful in the absence
of other means of consideration of issues by smaller
groups, their organization along essentially regional
political lines can be divisive and invites rigidity, particularly when the group has worked out delicate compromises that leave little flexibility for negotiation.
Some of the most effective negotiating and drafting
have been accomplished by unofficial groups with like
substantive interests, such as a coastal state group or
a group of states interested in compulsory dispute
settlement. The latter group, meeting under the cochairmanship of lhe El Salvador and Australian chiefs of
delegation with Prof. Louis Sohn of Harvard as rapporteur, prepared a set of alternative treaty texts on the important iss ues in this area. It was introduced i"n the
plenary Ill the final week of the conference with the cosponsorship of states from four ~liffcrent regional areas.
There also has been a group of individual international
lawyers, principally heads of delegations, meeting under
tho chninnanship of the chairman of the Norwegian delegation, which has been doing valuable work in seeking
to reduce the number of alternative texts and to arrive
at a single, widely acceptable text.
As a practical matter, the insistence that all states
be rc1Yrescntcd on official committees and working
gro ups ha s prevented the conduct of intcrscssionnl work
by official groups nnd has relegated intcrscssional work
principally to meetings of regional and unofficial groups.
Rule 1\laking and Compulsory Dispute Settlement.

In making law for the ocean, participants in the Law
or the Sea Conference arc in some respects engaged in
two rather distinct efforts. On the one hand they arc
drafting a constitution-that is, determining the respective juri sdiction of states and the Seabed Authority and
tlte aii\1Cati L'l1 of the power to determine and enforce
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rules of conduct for the activities of states and thctr
nationals in the oceans. ln addition, particularly when
there is nn overlap of .iurisdiction or an accommodation
of competing uses problem-as, for example, with respect to vessels in the economic zone--it may be desirable for the law of the sea treaty itself to sp.:ll out
the substantive rules to he applied. There arc many
areas, however-as, for example, the rules with respect
to the protection of the environment-where detailed
rule making may best be left to the future.
One very impo1tant clement in effective lawmaking
for the ocean may well be (or the conference itself
not to strive to establish rules of conduct in all areas,
but rather to concentrate on the few essential areas and
on rule-making machinery that cq uitably reflects population , geographic position, resources, development, and
other relevant factors, as well as numbers of sovereign
states. In a certain sense, in international lawmaking it
is not the one-nation, one-vote principle that best expresses the existing sovereign equality of states but
rather the right of each state to refuse to be bound in
the absenco of its consent. An agreement to accept
future rule making by some qualified majority is to that
extent a yielding of an individual state's sovereignty,
and this will only be acceptable if equitable procedures
for reflecting states' different interests arc found.
Second, in view of the necessary generality of many
of the provisions in the treaty and the necessity for the
accommodation of different: uses of the same ocean
space, particularly in the economic zone, it is important
that a lawmaking treaty for the ocean include effective
provisions for the compulsory settlement of disputes.
Compulsory dispute settlement machinery is the most
equitable and reasonable basis for dealing with the
many difficult boundary delimitation questions involving many quite dissimilar factual situations.
Conference Tests International Law
Lawmaking for the ocean is important not only
for the peaceful resolution of the critical issues of national and international interest but also for the development of the international legal process. If the international community cannot deal effectively with the
problems of lawmaking in this area, in which a large
measure of mutual accommodation appears feasible
and in which there is a very broad common interest in
minimum rules of order on which all can rely, thus
giving the negotiation a dimension going beyond the
mere maximi zation of particular national interests, the
prospects for dealing with other more intensely political
disputes is bleak indeed. If, on the other hand, in this
area in which internat ional law has played an important
role for so long, the Jaw can be successfully adapted
to the changes brought abo ut by the new technology
and the evolving str ucture of the international state
system, the gains should extend far beyond the ocean
to the benefit of international lawmaking and international institutions generally. A
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CHAMI!II!:RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 3, 1975

Re:

35 Orig. - U. S. v. Maine

MEMOAANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In this case there seems to be four Justices who think
an opinion (either per curiam or signed) should be
written.
Beyond doubt time is of the essence on this matter and
I believe we should announce the disposition as soon
as possible and let the opinion follow, unless the "brief"
opinion suggested by someone can come down within
two weeks, i.e., March 17.
Byron was perhaps the most vehement on the matter of
an opinion preceding the Decree and I assign the case
to him.
He will work out the possible remand to the
Special Master to consider the alternative basis for his
recommendation on the juridical bay at the southerly
tip of the mainland.
Regards,
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To: The
Mr .
Mr .
Mr.
Mr .
Mr .

Chief Justice
Justice Dougla8
J ustic e Brennan
J ustice Stewart
Justi c e Marshall
Just i ce Dla ckmun
~ Jus tice Powell
.M:r . ,Justice Rehnquis t

Ii'rom : Whl.te , J.

c::ro'.l1 at ed : ,.;;_

Rocj.r cula t e d:

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT 'OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 35, Orig.
United States, Plaintiff,

v.

I

On Bill of Complaint.

State of Maine et al.
[March -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under
Art. III, § 2, and 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), the United States
in April 1969 sought leave to file a complaint against the
13 States bordering on the Atlantic Ocean-Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Ca.rolina, Georgia, and Florida. 1 We granted
leave to file, 395 U. S. 955, on June 16, 1969·. The complaint asserted a separate cause of action against each of
the States and each alleged that:
"The United States is now entitled, to the exclusion
of the defendant State, to exercise sovereignty rights
over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic
Ocean, lying more than three geographical miles seaward from the ordmary low watermark and from the
outer limits of inland waters on the coast, extending
seaward to the outer edge of the Continental Shelf,
for the purpose of exploring the area and exploiting
the natural resources."
1 The State of Connecticut wa~ not made a defendant, apparently
because that State borders on Long Island Sound, which is considerPd inl:md waters rather than open sea.

·.~
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It was further alleged that each of the States claimed
some right or title to the relevant area and was interferring with the rights of the United States. It was
therefore prayed that a decree be entered declaring the
rights of the United States and that such further relief
be awarded as may prove proper. 2
The defendants answered, each generally denying proprietary rights of the United States in the seabed in the
area beyond the three-mile marginal sea. Each of them,
except Florida,8 claimed for itself, as successor in title
to certain grantees of the Crown of England (and in the
case of New York, to the Crown of Holland), the exclusive right of dominion and control over the seabed underlying the Atlantic Ocean seaward from its coastline to
the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States, asserting as well that any attempt by the United States to
interfere with these rights would in itself violate the
Constitution of the United States. 4
The United States also demandf'd an accounting for all sum that
the States may have derived from the area in question. This demand was ultimately denied for failure of proof.
8 The State of Florida claimed that by virtue of the Act of June 25,
1968, 15 Stat. 73, Congress had approved the maritime boundaries
for that State which at certain places included more than three miles
of the Atlantic Ocean and had thereby granted to the State all of the
Sf'abed Within those boundarieR. Florida also claimed in its answer
that the Florida Straits were not in the Atlantic Ocean as claimed
by the United States but in the Gulf of Mexico. Subsequently, thil
controversy between the Umted States and Florida was severed and
consolidated with the proceedmg m No. 9 Original which was then
concrrned with the seabed rights of the State of Florida in the Gulf of
Mexico, 403 U.S 949, 950 (1971). (The consolidated proceedings
wert> given a new number-Original 52. We have acted on the
Spt>cial Master's Report in that case. See ante, p. -.)
4 The States of Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Georgia each
,;ubmJtted an additional special defense applicable only to itself. We
agret· with the Rpecial Mast(:>r's rej(:>ctwn of the:;e special defenses,
and they will not be mentiOned further.
2
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Without acting on the motiou for judgment which was
filed by the United States and which asserted that there
was no material issue of fact to be resolved, we entered
an order appointing the Honorable Albert B. Maris as
Special Master and referred the case to him with authority to request further pleadings, to summon witnesses
and to take such evidence and submit such reports as he
might deem appropriate. 398 U.S. 941 (1970). Before
the Special Master, the United States contended that
based on United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947);
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United
States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950), it was entitled to
judgment in accordance with its motion. The defendant
States asserted that their cases were distinguishable from
the prior cases and that in any event, California, Louisiana, and Texas were erroneously decided and should be
overruled. They offered, and the Special Master received, voluminous documentary evidence to support
their claims that, contrary to the Court's prior decisions,
they acquired dominion over the offshore seabed prior
to the adoption of the Constitution and at no time relinquished· it to the United States. At the conclusion of
the proceeding before him, the Special Master submitted
a Report which the United States supports in all respects
but to which the States have submitted extensive and
detailed exceptions. The controversy is now before us
on the Report, the exceptions to it and the briefs and
oral arguments of the parties.
In his Report, the Special Master concluded that the
California, Louisiana and Texas cases, which he deemed
binding on him, governed this case and required that
judgment be entered for the United States. Assuming,
however, that those cases were open to re-examination,
the Special Master went on independently to examine
the legal and factual contentions of the States and con-
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eluded that they were without ment and that the Court's
prior cases should be reaffirmed.
We fully agree with the Special Master that California,
Louisiana, and Texas rule the issues before us. We also
decline to overrule those cases as the defendant States
request us to do.
United States v. California, supra, involved an original
action brought in this Court by the United States seeking
a decree declaring its paramount rights, to the exclusion
of California, to the seabed underlying the Pacific Ocean
and extending three miles from the coastline and from the
seaward limits of the State's inland waters. California
answered, claiming ownership of the disputed seabed.
The basis of its claim, as the Court described it, was that
the three-mile belt lay within the historic boundaries of
the State; "that the original States acquired frbm the
Crown of England title to all lands within their bouud--~-'-------'fai:rru
ie;'Ss'iuwiml3'ie~r~~~·~ waters, incJ udiug a three-mile belt
in adjacent seas; and that since California was admitted
as a State on an 'equal footing' with the original States,
California at that time became vested with title to all
such lands." 332 U. S., at 23. The Court rejected California's claim. The original Colonies had not "separately
acqUired ownership of the three-mile belt or the soil under
it, even if they did- acquire elements of the sovereignty of
the E11glish Crown by their revolution against it.'' 332
U S., at 31. As the Court viewed our history, dominion
over the marginal sea was first accomplished by the N atwnal Government rather than by the Colonies or by the
~ tates . Moreover. the Court went on to hold that the
" protection and control of [the margmal sea] has been
aud is a function of national external sovereignty, '' 332
U. S., at 34, and that in our constitutiOnal system paramoun t rights over the ocean waters and their seabed were
vested in the F ederal Government.
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The United States later brought actions to confirm its
title to the seabed adjacent to the coastline of other
States. United States v. Louisiana, supra, was one of
them. There Louisiana claimed title to the seabed under
waters extending 27 miles into the Gulf of Mexico, the
basis of the claim being that before and since the time of
her admission to the Union, Louisiana had exercised dominion over the ocean area in question and that her
legislature had formally included the 27-mile belt within
the boundaries of the State. The Court gave judgment
for the United States, holding that United States v. California was controlling and emphasizing that paramount
rights in the marginal sea and seabed were incidents of
national sovereignty:
I
"As we pointed out in United States v. California,
the issue in this class of litigation does not turn on
title or owriership in the conventional sense. California, like the thirteen original colonies, never acquired ownership in the marginal sea. The claim to
our three-mile belt was first asserted by the national
government. Protection and control of the area are
indeed funptions of national external sovereignty.
332 U. S. pp. 31-34. The marginal sea is a national,
not a state concern. National interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The·
problems of commerce, national defense, relations
with other powers, war and peace focus there. National ngh~s must therefore be paramount in that
area." 339 U. S., at 704..
Louisiana had "no stronger claim to ownership of the
marginal sea than the or'iginaJ 13 Colonies or California
had," id., at 705; and its claim, like theirs, gave way to
the overriding rule that "the three-mile belt is in th~ gomain of the Natjon rather than of the separate State¥,id.,

J:J
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at 7. A fortiori, the waters and seabed beyond that limit
were governed by the same rule.
In a companion case, United States v. Texas, supra,
the Court again reaffirmed the holding and rationale of
United States v. California and again rejected the claims
of the State based on her historic boundaries and congressional recognition of those boundaries at the time of
the State's admission to the Union:
"If the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward
of low-water mark, its use, disposition, management,
and control involve national interests and national
responsibilities. That is the source of national rights
in it. Such is the rationale of the California decision,
which we have applied to Louisiana's case. The
same result must be reached here if 'equal footing'
with the various States is to be achieved. Unless
any claim or title which the Republic of Texas had
to the marginal sea is subordinated to this full paramount power of the United States on admission,
there is or may be in practical effect a subtraction in
favor of Texas from the national sovereignty of the
United States. Yet neither the original thirteen
States (United States v. California, supra, pp. 31-32)
nor California nor Louisiana enjoys such an advantage." 339 U . S., at 719.
The Special Master was correct in concluding that these
cases, unless they are to be overruled, completely dispose
of the States' claims of ownership in this case. These
decisions considered and expressly rejected the assertion
that the original States were entitled to the seabed under
the three mile marginal sea. They also held that under
our constitutional arrangement p:aramount rights to the
lands underlying the marginal sel:t are an incident to national sovereignty and that their control and disposition
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in the first instance are the business of the Federal Government rather than the States.
The States seriously contend that the prior cases, as
well as the Special Master, were in error in denying that
the original colonies had substantial rights in the seabed
prior to independence, and afterwards, by grant. from or
succession to the sovereignty of the Crown. Given the
dual basis of the California decision, however, and of
those that followed it, the States' claims of ownership
prior to the adoption of the Constitution are not dispositive. Whatever interest the States might have had immediately prior to statehood, the Special Master was
correct in reading the Court's cases to hold that as a
matter of "purely leg~tl principle ... the Constitution ...
allotted to the federal Government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and national defense" and
that "it necessarily follows as a matter of constitutional
law, that as attributes to these external sovereign facts,
the federal government has paramount rights in the marginal sea." Report, at 23.
United States v. Texas unmistakably declares this constitutional proposition. There, Texas claimed that prior
to joining the Union, she was an independent sovereign
with boundaries extending a substantial distance in the
Gulf of Mexico-boundaries which Congress had •
u 1n · recognized when Texas was admitted to the
Union. In deciding against the State, the Court did not
reject the prestatehood rights of Texas as it had the rights
of the t3 original States in the California case. On the
contrary, the Court was quite willing to "assume that as
a republic she had not only full sovereignty over the
mareinal sea but ownership of it, of the land underlying
it and of all the riches which it held. In other words, we
assume that it had dominium and imperium in and over
this belt which the United States now claims." 339•U.S.,
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at 717 Such prior ownership nevertheless did not survive becoming a member of the Union! weea tlumgh the=
ltithi is hoami&J its u.f 'Pews h&8 ~@ill recognieiil 8,Qa, ~~ urn•

(IWhen Texas came into the Union, she ceased to
be an independent nation. She then became a sister
State on an 'equal footing' with all the other States.
Th~t act concededly entailed a relinquishment of
some of her sovereignty. The United States then
took her place as respects foreign commerce, the
waging of war, the making of treaties, defense of
the shores, and the like. In external affairs the
United States became the sole and exclusive spokesman of the Nation. We hold that as an incident to
the transfer of that sovereignty any claim that Texas
may have had to the marginal sea was relinquished
to the United States." 339 U. S., at 717-718.
The Court stood squarely on the California and Louisiana
cases for this conclusion; and in our view, the Special
Master correctly read these authorities, unless they were
to be overruled in all respects, as foreclosing the present
efforts of the States to demonstrate error in the Court's
understanding of history in the California case.
Assuming the possibility, however, that the Court
might re-examine the constitutional premise of California
and similar cases, the Special Master proceeded, with
admirable diligence and lucidity, to address the historical
evidence presented by t e ta es and aimed primarily at
establishing that the Colonies had legitimate claims to the
marginal sea prior to independence and statehood and
that the new States never surrendered these rights to the
Federal Government. The SpeCial Master's ultimate
conclusion was that the Court's view of our history expressed in the Califorma case was essentially correct and
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that if prior cases were open to re-examination, they
should be reaffirmed m all respects.
We need not retrace the Special Master's analysis of
historical evidence, for we are firmly convinced that we
should not undertake to re-examine the constitutional
underpinnings of the California case and of those cases
which followed and explicated the rule that paramount
rights to the offshore .:eabed inhere in the Federal Government as an mcide
of national sovereignty. That
premise, as we have indicated, has been repeated time
and agam in the cases. It is also our view, contrary to
the contentions of the States, that the premise was embraced rather than repudiated by Congress in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. In that legislation, it is true,
Congress transferred to the States the rights to the seabed underlying the marginal sea; but this transfer was
in no WISe inconsistent with paramount national power
but was merely an exercise of that authority. As the
Special Master said, the Court in its prior cases "did not
indicate that the federal government by Act of Congress
might not, as it did by the subsequently enacted Submerged Lands Act, grant to the riparian States rights to
the resources of the federal area, subject to the reservation by the federal government of its rights and powers
of regulation anrl control for purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and internatiOnal affairs"
Report, at 16. The question before the Court in the
Calijornw case was "whether the state or the Federal
Government has the paramount right and power to determin(' in the first mstance when, how, and by what agencie:s. foreign or domestic, the oil and othet resources of
the soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered , may be exploited." 332 U. S., at 29. The decision
the re was that the National Government had the power
at issue , the Court declining to speculate that "Congress,
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which has constitutwnal
over government property, will execute 1ts power in such a way as to bring
about injustices to States, their subdivisions, or persons
acting pursuant to their permission." 332 U. S., at 40.
The Submerged Lu,nds Act did indeed grant to the
States dominion over the offshore seabed within the
limits defined m the Act and released the States from
any liability to account for any prior income received
from state leases that had been granted with respect to
the marginal sea ~ But in further exercise of paramount
national authority, the Act expressly declared that nothing in the Act
''shall be deemed to affect in any wise the rights of
the United States to the natural resources of that
portion of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental
Shelf lying seaward and outside of [the marginal
sea] all of which natural resources appertain to the
United States. and the jurisdiction and control of
which by the United States is confirmed." 43
u.s. c. § 1302.
This declaratwn by Congress is squarely at odds with /;1
the assertions of the States in the present case. More- V \
over, m the course of litigation dealing with the reach
and impact of the Act, the Court has said as plainly as
may be that "the Act concededly did not impair the
validity of the California, Louisiana and Texas cases,
which are admittedly applicable to all coastal States .... "
United States v. Lou,isiana, 363 U. S. 7; see also id., at 83
n 140. We agree with the Special Maste"" when he said
that "It is qmtr obvious that Congress could reserve to
the fede~al government all the rights to the seabed of the
Continental Shelf beyond the three-mile territorial belt of
sea (or three leagues in the case of certain Gulf States)
The Submergrd Lando Art \\as held con;;tJtutional in Alabama\ .
7'exas,347 U 8.272 (1954).
5
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only upon the basis that it already had the paramount \
right to that seabed under the rule laid down in the
Californ·ia case.'' Report, at 19.
Congress emphatically implemented its view that the
United States has paramount rights to the seabed beyond the three-mile limit when a few months later it
enacted the Continental Lands Act of 1953. 43 U. S. C.
§ 1331 et seq. Section 3 of the Act
"declared [it] to be the policy of the United States
that the fo>ubsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental
Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition
as provided in this subchapter."

\.

The Act then proceeds to set out detailed provisions for
the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the area and for
the leasing and development of the resources of the
seabed.
Of course, the defendant States were not parties to
United States v. California or to the relevant decisions
and they are not precluded by res adjudicata from litigating the issues decided by those cases. But the doctrine of stare dec1:sis is still a powerful force in our jurisprudence; and alth9ugh on occasion the Court has
declared-and acted accordingly-that constitutional decisions are open to re-examination, we are convinced that
th~ doctrine has peculiar force and relevance in the present context. It is apparent that in the almost 30 years
sincP California, a great deal of public and private business has been transacted in accordance with those decisions and in accordance with major legislation enacted
by Congress, a principle purpose of which was to resolve
the "interminable litigation" arising over the controversy
of the ownership of the lands underlying the marginal
sea. See H. R. Rep. 1\o. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2
(1953) . Both th(~ Submerged Lands Act and Outer Con-

•'·
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tinental Shelf Lands Act which soon followed proceeded
from the premises established by prior Court decisions
and provided for the orderly development of offshore re~
sources. Smce 1953. when this legislation was enacted,
33 lease sales have been held, in which 940 leases, embracing over eight million acres, have been issued. The
Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over
three billion barrels of oil, 19 trillion m.c.f. of natural gas,
13 million long tons of sulfur, and over four million long
tons of salt. 0 In 19'73 alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and
8.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas have been extracted
daily from the Outer Continental Shelf. 7 Exploitation of
our resources offshore implic~:ttes a broad range of federal
legislation, ranging from the Longshoremen's aDd Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, incorporated into the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, to the more recent Coastal
Zone Management Act. 8 We are quite sure that it would
be inappropriate to disturb our prior cases, major legislatiOn, and many years of commercial activity 9 by calling
into question, at this date, the constitutional premise of
prior decisions. We add only that the Atlantic States,
by virtue of the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases, as
well as by reason of the Submerged Lands Act, have been
on notice of the substantial body of authoritative law,
8. Rc]J . "No . 901140, 9;id Cong., 2d Ses:;; , 4 (1974) .
ld., at 4.
g 86 Stat 1281
For a summary of legislation affecting the Outer
Continental Shelf, see Outt>r Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development and the Coastal Zone, A Report for the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 55-58 (1974).
u We have long held that the doctrine of stare decisis carries parti<'ular force where the effect of re-examination of a prior rule would
be to overturn long-accepted commercial practice. See, e. g.,
M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. (U.S .) 598, 602 (1824);
Rock Spring D!Stilltny Co v. W A . Gaines & Co .. 246 U.S. 312, 32()
(1918) .
o
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both constitutional and statutory, which is squarely at
odds with claims of theirs to the seabed beyond the threemile marginal sea. Neither the -States nor their putative
lessees have been in the slightest misled. Judgment
should be entered for the United States.
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